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In this project, I explore whether imposed, liberal institutions installed by a colonial
power affect the persistence of democracies in the postcolonial period. If a state im-
poses democratic institutions within another state will the imposed polity persist?
To answer that question, I examine the impact of imposed liberal institutions and
the citizenry’s interaction with those institutions on democratic survival of the polity
after independence. To test hypotheses regarding the imposition of liberal institu-
tions and democratic survival, I employ duration analysis. In this project I introduce
the concept of liberal steps which allows for modelling of the iterative expansion of
liberal rights in polities. Using sequence analysis, a relatively new method to polit-
ical science, to investigate the process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies
and the effect of those steps on post-independence democracy. I find imposed liberal
institutions contribute to the longevity of democracy in polities after independence.
Each liberal step significantly enhances the likelihood of democratic survival of the
polity. Using sequence analysis, I reveal two patterns of successful democracies those
where institutions took root quickly and those which had many years of interaction
with liberal institutions. Overall, my results indicate external impositions will be
successful experiences and interactions with liberal instituions. Although built by
imposers, the institutions must be adopted by the citizenry as they are seen as legit-
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Colonial Legacy
and Imposed Institutions
1.1 Introduction of Research Project
If a state imposes a government, or polity1, within another state will it persist? Or is
an imposed polity doomed to failure, as the governmental structures did not grow
organically within the state? I explore the likelihood of the survival of imposed
democratic polities. My research question is whether imposed, liberal institutions
installed by the colonial power affect the persistence in the postcolonial period. I
examine the relationship between liberal institutions and democratic survival. Lastly,
using a relatively new method to political science, sequence analysis, I examine the
process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies and the corresponding effect on
the colony after independence.
The installation of new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as, the ad-
vocacy of democracy as a cure for conflict and poor human rights provision draw
attention to governments created by outside actors. Governments such as those most
recently established in Afghanistan and Iraq are the products of outside influence
and likely would not have developed as they did, or even at all, without such influ-
ence. While not new, attempts to impose polities have recently received increased
attention internationally (Ajami 2003; Dawisha and Dawisha 2003; Patten 2003; Tel-
hami 2003; Zakaria 2003; McFaul 2004; Enterline and Greig 2005a; Pickering and
Peceny 2006; Youngs 2006; Walker and Pearson 2007; Enterline and Greig 2008a,b;
Goldsmith 2008; Merkel 2009). However, systematic research on imposed polities,
the persistence and legacy of imposition, is a relatively new and under-studied area
of international relations and comparative politics.
Governments were installed in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States in an at-
tempt to resolve regional and internal security concerns. Among the largest benefits
1I explain the term in greater detail later in this chapter
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is the alleged pacifying benefit of democracy. According to the democratic peace
proposition, also referred to as the democratic peace, democracies do not go to war
with one another; this proposition has been heralded as the closest thing to law in in-
ternational politics (Levy 1988). The democratic peace traces its roots back to Kant’s
(1996) Perpetual Peace and was first empirically tested by Babst (1964). Since then,
the democratic peace has expanded to a wide body of literature providing support-
ing and dissenting evidence for the proposition. Criticisms of the body of literature
cite problems with the evidence (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997); the war proneness
of democratizing states (Mansfield and Snyder 1995); alternative causal arguments
(Weede 2004; Gartzke 2007; McDonald 2007; Mousseau 2013); and operational-
izations of the terms democracy and war (Bayer and Bernhard 2010; Spiro 1996).
Despite the plethora of criticisms of the democratic peace literature, policy-makers
and leaders of democratic states have embraced the proposition and cite it as a basis
for unproblematized democratization policies.
The promotion of democracy has overtaken the foreign policy of the United States.
Famously, in his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton (1994) ar-
gues, “Democracies don’t attack each other... Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure
our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy
elsewhere.” Like Clinton, policy-makers advocate polity imposition or democracy
promotion to cure a myriad of problems such as regional conflict, reconstruction of
post-conflict states, and security threats (Bush 2002; Allaf, Ansari, Assam, Hollis,
Lowe, Mekelberg, Ozel, Stansfield, and Yamani 2004; Tomkins 2004; Buisson 2007).
In the Post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy shifted from an overarching policy of
containment to democratic enlargement (Lake 1993). The promotion of democracy
was argued as the best way to protect U.S. interests and security. Madeleine Albright,
Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration states “[t]aken together, our
strategy looks to the enlargement of democracy and markets abroad” (1993). Since
the end of the Cold War, U.S. Republicans and Democrats have equally supported
liberal expansion. A major tenet of George Bush’s foreign policy agenda, also known
as the Bush Doctrine, is the active extension of democracy, liberty, and security to
all regions of the world. Under the Bush administration governments were imposed
in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush articulated this tenet at a speech given at
West Point: “we will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great
powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on
every continent” (2002).
The focus on democratization and democratic expansion remains a cornerstone of
American foreign policy during the Obama presidency. Early in his administration,
however, Obama sought to distance the United States from the practice of imposi-
tion and move instead towards a more vague support of democracies and liberal
principles abroad. At Cairo University, President Barack Obama stated “no system
of government can or should be imposed by one nation by another” (2009). Later,
he expressed support for democracy expansion in the 2010 National Security Strat-
egy, in which he calls for the United States to ensure new and fragile democracies
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“deliver tangible improvements for their citizens.” (Obama 2010, 37) Additionally,
he called for constructive engagement with non-democratic regimes; the recogni-
tion of peaceful democratic movements; support of rights for women and children;
the advancement of democratic values through a broad coalition of governments,
nongovernmental institutions and intergovernmental organizations; and support of
technological advances which promote free access to information (Obama 2010).
More recently, in the 2015 National Security Statement, Obama indicateds that there
may be some unspecified rewards and punishments for movements to or away from
democracy: “Our focus is on supporting countries that are moving in the right direc-
tion - whether it is the peaceful transitions of power we see in sub-Saharan Africa;
the movement toward constitutional democracy in Tunisia; or the opening taking
place in Burma. In each, instance, we are creating incentives for positive reform and
disincentives for backsliding” (Obama 2015, 20). Even though Obama has attempted
to distance the United States from the imposition of democracy, the promotion of
democracy remains a central goal of American foreign policy.
The promotion and support for the expansion of democracy is not limited to the
United States. The foreign policies of many western democracies and international
organizations include support for liberal tenants and democratic expansion. Similar
to the United States, the United Kingdom has supported democracy as a solution
for conflict. Tony Blair argues the only viable state for Palestine is democratic state
(Tomkins 2004). Likewise, Former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
(2006) explained, “liberal democracy is the soundest basis for peace and prosperity.
It’s the basis for dynamism and innovation. It’s in Australia’s national interest for
democracy to spread. And so it’s a core value of our foreign policy.” The United
Nations fosters many programs to encourage democracy across the globe. Although
democracy takes time to take root, Ban Ki-moon (2012) argued states in the world,
“must join forces to nurture progress until democracy takes a firm root in all coun-
tries around the world... Democracy is not just a matter of giving people a voice . . .
it advances development.” Turning from their previous policy of avoiding democ-
racy promotion, Indian policy-makers have released statements supporting democ-
racy abroad and expressions of willingness to promote and support democratization
abroad (Mazumdar and Statz 2015).
Critics of state-building and external democratization argue that the imposition of
democracy is not effective in achieving foreign policy outcomes. Walzer (2008) ar-
gues democracies must grow organically, they cannot be created by outside actors
but rather states wishing to promote or create polity change should support civic
actors and movements within states. Research on the outcomes of polity imposition
lend support to the argument that the benefits of polity imposition may not be as
forthcoming as politicians and policy-makers infer. Enterline and Greig (2005a) find
evidence that imposed polities are fragile over the entire existence of the polity. Thus,
the polity may not last long enough or be robust enough to provide the intended for-
eign policy benefits.
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Although some readers may object that polity imposition is a phenomenon of the
past, as the most recent impositions in Iraq and Afghanistan have not fared well,
I would answer that democracy promotion is still in the lexicon of foreign policy.
Owen (2002) whose work I will discuss in greater detail later, argues that waves of
imposition occur after major international events; in other words, polity imposition
occurs regularly after wars or changes in power. Granted polity imposition may not
occur frequently, it is important to study systematically, as it happens regularly. Such
actions have important implications for the imposer, the imposed polity, the region of
the imposed polity, and potentially, the international system. Despite the stalling of
democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, the promotion or enlargement of democracy is
still a central part of foreign policy for the United States (Enterline and Greig 2008a),
as well as many other industrialized democracies.
To study the impact of the imposition of liberal institutions, I turn to former colonies
with imposed liberal institutions. Such colonies provide a good comparison group
for imposed polities. Liberal institutions, also referred to as power-sharing insti-
tutions, were created to facilitate colonial administration and resource extraction.
In many cases, the colonies retained the institutions after independence. The colo-
nial legacy literature points toward the importance of institutions to the longevity
of the polity in the post-colonial era (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jack-
man 1985; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). The British were more likely
than other colonizers to create institutions. The British tutelage systems were set
up in the colonies because they understood the benefits for colonial administration.
The institutions created allowed for delegation of power to local agents. Despite
the argument’s basis on institutions, this proposition is tested in the literature by
dichotomous variables denoting British colonial history. However, British colonial
practice varied across colonies. Some had a host of liberal imposed institutions while
other had very few and others had none. Likewise, the postcolonial experience var-
ied; some failed, while others persisted. I look towards imposed, liberal institutions
to answer the question of why some persisted and others failed.
The study of external forces of democratization is small when compared to the body
of work on internal forces of democracy; for the most part, research on regime transi-
tions focuses on domestic factors contributing to shifts in political institutions. How-
ever, other researchers suggest the focus on domestic factors overlooks important
causal contributions by foreign policy or international factors (Huntington 1991;
Gasiorowski 1995; Remmer 1999). Investigating regime change and democratiza-
tion through polity imposition contributes to an overlooked area in political research.
This investigation of democratization through imposition is especially important as
democratic promotion has become a central tenet of modern democracies’ foreign
policy.
Through this project, I seek to answer how imposed, liberal institutions installed
by colonizers affect the longevity of the democratic polity of the former colony. In
other words, I test the impact of imposed, liberal institutions on the likelihood of
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democratic survival in the post-colonial period. This project addresses the gaps in
knowledge between the installation of liberal institutions by a foreign power and the
longevity of democracy.
1.2 Central Terms
Throughout this project, I use several key terms which I will identify in this section.
I use Harold Laski’s definition of state: “a territorial society divided into government
and subjects claiming, within its allotted physical area, a supremacy over all other
institutions” (2015, 21). Laski’s definition is similar to Weber’s definition which de-
notes a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (2009, 155). However, this
project does not concentrate on the state as a whole; rather, I am concerned with
those structures which govern the state.
Government is frequently used to identify both the structure of the political institu-
tions within the state and a particular government in power. For example, govern-
ment may refer to a democratic government, which refers to a structure of authority
in which there is participation by the citizens and the provision of civil rights. In the
New Zealand context, the National Government, on the other hand, refers to the Na-
tional Party, which holds control of the government. While government is the most
commonly referred to term, I use polity as it relates more specifically to the topic
of this thesis. A polity is defined as “a particular form of government that exists
within a state or an institution” (Collin 2001, 183). As the main focus of my thesis is
imposed institutions within a state, the term polity more accurately reflects that line
of inquiry.
States whose institutions were created by outside powers are referred to as imposed
polities. To build upon new work on imposed polities I adopt the same operational-
ization as Enterline and Greig (Enterline and Greig 2005a, 2008a,b). An imposed
polity is a state whose governmental institutions have been created by foreign powers
through military or nonmilitary forces. Under this definition, post-colonial states are
not imposed polities unless the colonizer constructed institutions within the colony
during the colonial period. A state is considered an imposed polity from the date
of its imposition until it is replaced by a new polity or it experiences a period of
polity interruption2. It is considered to persist as long as it maintains the institu-
tions similar to its founding. However, during its lifespan a polity’s democracy score
may vary. The imposer does not need to continue to interact with the target, as
long as the institutions it created survives. Not all colonizers left institutions or cre-
ated new polities during decolonization. Some simply withdrew from their colony
without liberal structures in place. Therefore, it is extremely important to examine
2See Polity 3d for more information on periods of interruption.
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each polity created as a result of decolonization to distinguish between those polities
whose institutions were created by the colonial power and those whose institutions
were indigenously created by the newly independent state.
The imposed institutions addressed here are liberal or democratic institutions that
include power-sharing structures installed by the colonial power. Colonialism is “the
policy and practice of a strong power extending its control territorially over a weaker
nation or people” (Mclean and McMillan 2003, 92). Mahoney and vom Hau explain,
“[b]y definition, a colonial state is subservient to another state; colonial states are
not sovereign entities” (2005, 98). I am concerned with colonies which are ruled
by foreign powers but are not settler colonies in which the colonial power sends
its citizens to settle and control the territory. The colonies of interest in this study
are those where power-sharing institutions were created to administer the colony.
Colonial legacy refers to the lasting effects of colonization on various aspects of the
colony after independence. The aspects include economic development, political
cleavages, and political institutions. Out of all the aforementioned aspects, political
institutions are the focus of this project.
Institutions imposed by the colonial powers in the colonies include free and fair
elections, judiciary, popularly elected legislatures and constitutions. Imposed lib-
eral steps capture the incremental installation of power-sharing structures. Most
imposed, liberal institutions were created over time rather than imposed the com-
plete institution at once. A prime example of this incremental process lies in the
political institution of constitutions. The first constitution imposed often provided
some civil liberties. Subsequent constitutions increased the civil rights provided by
the constitutions. Each expansion of rights is considered a liberal step. In cases were
an institution is withdrawn, then the number of liberal steps is decreased by one. In
cases were an institution simply replaces another without expanding rights or power-
sharing, it is not considered a liberal step. In Section 1.3, I discuss the identification
of imposed, liberal institutions
1.3 Research Questions and Methodology
1.3.1 Does the presence of imposed, liberal institutions contribute to demo-
cratic survival?
My primary research question is whether imposed, liberal institutions lead to greater
odds of democratic survival. In Chapter Two, I test whether the presence of imposed,
liberal institutions support democratic survival after independence. First, I exam-
ine whether the presence of imposed, liberal institutions contribute to post-colonial
democratic survival. Former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are more
likely to persist after independence than democracies which did not have liberal,
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imposed institutions. Secondly, British colonies with liberal, imposed institutions
are more likely to survive than British colonies without imposed, liberal institutions.
I construct a dataset of democracies with imposed, liberal institutions installed by
colonial powers. To compare the impact of the presence of imposed, liberal institu-
tions, I use countries which started a democratic episode between 1946 and 1970 as a
comparison group. My dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period
1951-2010. The dataset consists of democratic episodes which end during the time
period covered by the data set and those that endure past 2010. To test my hypothe-
ses I employ a duration model, the results of which indicate the impact each variable
has on the probability the polity will survive. The results provided by this model
indicates the impact imposed, liberal institutions have on democratic survival. Prior
studies have noted the importance of British colonial legacy. As I will discuss later in
the literature review, the majority of arguments regarding British colonial legacy rest
on the power-sharing institutions created within the country. Through my analysis,
I test this relationship and the results expand our understanding of how imposed,
liberal institutions contribute to the persistence of a colony’s democratic polity.
1.3.2 Does experience with imposed, liberal institutions contribute to the
survival of democratic polities?
In Chapter Three, I investigate the relationship between experience with liberal, im-
posed steps and the survival of democratic polities. Literature citing positive benefits
of colonial power-sharing institutions imply experience with the institutions and the
ability of the institutions to channel interests are central to the survival of the demo-
cratic polity. In other words, the institutions must work for the citizenry and there
should be sufficient experience with the institutions over time to earn the citizen’s
faith in the institutions. Imposed, liberal institutions were installed over time rather
than as complete institutions. To model this process, I use liberal steps to capture
the expansion of liberal institutions. A liberal step denotes the expansion of demo-
cratic rights to the colony. To test my hypothesis that is the more experience with
liberal steps in the colony, the greater likelihood of democratic persistence in the post-
colonial period - I construct a dataset of democracies with imposed, liberal steps. I
use duration analysis to test whether the number of imposed, liberal steps has an
impact on democratic survival. To test whether the number of years with imposed,
liberal steps contribute to greater likelihood of polity survival, I employ sequence
analysis. This method, relatively new to political science, allows for comparison of
sequences between polities which survived and those that failed. The inclusion of
number of imposed, liberal steps and study of the sequences allow analysis of demo-
cratic experience on post-colonial democratic survival.
1.3.3 How does the imposition of liberal steps affect democratic survival?
In Chapter Four, I examine the process of the imposition of liberal steps and its im-
pact on the survival of democratic polities. First, I present two brief case studies of
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imposed polities: Jamaica and Uganda. Both polities were former colonies under
British control in which the British imposed liberal institutions. However, Jamaica
survived while Uganda failed. What accounts for the opposite outcomes? Through
my analysis of the cases, I conclude that it is the amount of experience in terms of
time and number of imposed liberal steps which is the key to answering my question.
The more liberal imposed steps and the greater the amount of experience in terms
of time, the more likely the polity is to survive in the post-colonial period. To test
my proposition, I survey and gather data on the liberalization process for all coun-
tries with imposed, liberal steps in my dataset. This method allows me to examine
the timing of imposed liberal steps and the depth of liberalization imposed by the
colonial power. Additionally, it blends quantitative analysis with rich, descriptive
data. Through this analysis, I reveal patterns of liberal imposition and how those
institutions affect the polity after independence. It also illustrates the usefulness of
sequence analysis in the examination of democratic transitions and other processes
in political science.
1.4 Cases Included
I use Enterline and Greig’s imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previ-
ously discussed in the literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed
institutions which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Imposed, liberal
institutions include a legislative body, a judiciary and an electoral system under
which citizens directly elect representatives, elected leaders, constitutions outlining
the rights of citizens and the government’s obligations to its citizenry. The number
of imposed institutions vary by colony; in some colonies very few institutions were
installed, while others had a host of institutions created by the colonial power. The
list of the former colonies with imposed institutions is included in Figure 1.1.
At the beginning of this project, I sought to gather data on whole, liberal institutions
created by the colonizers. However, as I gathered data for my cases, I observed that
the colonial powers did not install complete institutions. Constitutions installed by
colonial powers did not grant a host of democratic rights, but rather the documents
introduced rights in small increments. Another example of this process can be found
in representation on legislative bodies. Often electoral elements in the legislative
bodies were expanded over time. Rather than changing all members on legislative
bodies from appointed to elected, the colonial powers often introduced elected mem-
bers gradually. At first, one or two elected members were added to the legislative
council. Over time, the colonial power increased the number of elected members
on the body. “The development of democracy occurs in a piecemeal fashion with
some elements of democracy occurring early, while other institutional components
of democracy lagging behind” (Enterline and Greig 2008a, 325). This process led
me to develop the conceptualization of imposed liberal step. An imposed liberal
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Figure 1.1: Colonies with Imposed, Liberal Institutions
step is defined as the introduction of a democratic element to a colony’s government.
Each step builds upon the previous and expands the state’s level of democracy and
increases democratic rights for the citizen’s of the colony. In other words, each step
moves the state closer to a full democracy with universal suffrage, a judiciary, and
an elected legislative body. Figure 1.2 illustrates the incremental process of democra-
tization through the imposition of liberal steps. Institutional steps include:
• elected member on a decision-making body;
• judiciary;
• constitution outlining citizens’ rights;
• expansion of suffrage;
• free and fair elections
• increase of number of elected members on a decision-making body;
• amendments to constitution to include more liberal rights;
• adoption of a new constitution which provides more rights than the previous
constitution;
• popularly elected leader;
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• full enfranchisement; and
• autonomous, democratic rule within colony.
For example, I code the creation of a legislative council with some elected repre-
sentation as one step. If the council is expanded to allow more popularly elected
representation, I code such a situation as another step as it is increasing the amount
of democratic interaction available to the citizenry. If the council is transformed into a
completely, popularly elected legislature, I code that as liberal step. Institutions were
included only if they contributed to the liberalization of the colony. For example, the
creation of Executive and Legislative Councils that included only appointed mem-
bers are not coded as a liberal step. However, amendments to the councils which
introduced an elected element are considered to be a liberal step. This operational-
ization allows for the colonies to be placed along a continuum indicating the level of
liberal rights present within the colony prior to independence. I use this conceptu-
alization as it reflects the actual process of liberalization used by the colonial powers
as well as the technique used to imposed democracies
Appendix A includes time lines for each case where the liberal institutional steps,
start of colony, independence, and failure of the polity, if the polity fails, are included
above the time line. Important historical dates are included below the time line. I
use historical records to gather my data on imposed liberal steps. In particular, I use
British Central Office of Information Pamphlets which provided detailed information
on the imposed institutions and liberal steps. Additionally, I consult United States
Library of Congress Country Reports, Historical Dictionaries of the countries as well
as individual country histories for my cases. These sources provide information
on the date of creation and structure of the institution. Multiple sources allow for
clarification of the structure of the institutions and the democratic element included
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and confirmation of the accuracy of the institutions. This builds on previous work of
colonial legacy and imposed as institutions as previous work captured institutional
impacts of colonial legacy indirectly. As a result previous researchers were unable to
capture the incremental nature of this type of imposition. This data allows for the
examination of why some democracies are more likely to persist than others. It also
speaks to the ongoing debate about British colonial legacy by measuring the causal
variable, liberal institutions and testing the impact of those structures on the survival
of the polity.
.
1.5 Significance of the Study
This project speaks to three distinct literature - colonial legacy, democratization, and
polity imposition. My thesis adds to the colonial legacy literature by clarifying the
causal mechanism of colonial legacy. I build upon our understanding of the British
colonial legacy effect by directly testing the institutional argument. I introduce the
amount of time the polity had with the imposed institutions and, in addition, I ex-
amine the interaction of imposition and elite support for institutions. This project
provides insight on the relationship between institutional experience and democratic
survival, which also informs what we know about democratization. This project
adds to the democratization literature by clarifying the role of external states in de-
mocratization and also contributes to our knowledge about how external actors can
influence the internal dynamics of other states Lastly, my project explains the insti-
tutional influence on the persistence of imposed democracies. The more experience
with imposed democratic institutions the greater the likelihood of polity persistence.
The results of this project hold significance for today’s international system.Using the
results, policy-makers’ assertions regarding democracy promotion may be assessed
using empirical evidence rather than analogies. Additionally, lessons learned from
my findings may be applied to state building and rebuilding post-conflict states. The
contributions of this thesis can be divided into two areas: substantive and method-
ological. The substantive contribution of this project is the introduction of measure-
ments of liberal imposed institutions and liberal steps to models of colonial legacy
and democratic survival. This project demostrates it is possible to capture and model
institutional arguments present in the colonial legacy literature and the incremental
process of democratization. Secondly, the use of duration and analysis and sequence
analysis demonstrate the methodological contribution of introducing contextual de-
tails to quantitative analysis of democratization.
Following this section is a literature review of the relevant literature in imposed
polities and colonial legacy. Chapter Two includes a a test of whether imposed in-
stitutions have an impact on the persistence of imposed polities. Building upon the
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institutional argument, I test the impact of institutional experience on the longevity of
imposed, democratic polities in Chapter Three. Chapter Four includes an in-depth
investigation of the process of liberal imposition using sequence analysis. Finally,
Chapter Five includes a discussion of this project’s conclusions and implications.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Overview of Literature Review
In the opening section of this chapter, I outlined and discussed the motivations for my
study of imposed institutions in former colonies and what lessons they may provide
for modern, imposed polities. The purpose of this chapter is to connect this study to
previous scholarly attempts to understand the phenomena of democratization, polity
imposition, colonial legacy, and democratic survival. Specifically, my purpose here
is to establish what has been revealed in these four bodies of literature. Although
these bodies of literature are often discussed separately, I explain how these bodies of
work form the basis for the arguments examined in my study. In addition, I identify
how this synthesis can inform our understanding of imposed political institutions
and democratic survival.
The amount of potentially relevant literature is large; therefore it be divided into a
number of sections. First, I discuss external factors which contribute to democratiza-
tion. Second, I examine research on polity imposition; why states impose polities and
what are the effects of polity imposition. Third, as some imposed polities are former
colonies, I turn to the colonial legacy literature. Lastly, I assess the body of research
on installed colonial institutions and the impact on post-independence, democratic
survival. Having described the purposes and scope of this literature review, I will
now review the democracy and democratization literature.
2.2 External Factors of Democratization
For the most part, research on regime transitions focuses primarily on domestic fac-
tors which contribute to shifts in political institutions. However, researchers of de-
mocratization (e.g. Huntington 1991; Starr 1991; Gasiorowski 1995; Pridham 1995;
Linz and Stepan 2011; Anderson 1999; Remmer 1999) suggest that this focus on
domestic factors is myopic and excludes important causal contributions by foreign
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policy or international factors. Neighboring states, alliances, trade relationships,
sanctions, conflict, and imposition are among the external factors that play an im-
portant role in democratization. Not all transitions to democracy come from within
a polity; the impetus for democratization may stem from external actors, states, in-
ternational organizations, or forces. Or an interaction between internal and external
factors may lead to a democratic regime change (Beichelt 2012). External actors play
an important role in democratization, argues Huntington (1991). He cites external
forces as influential in the third wave of democratization. The European Community
was instrumental in regime changes in Southern Europe, while the absence of the
Soviet Union created opportunities for democratization in Eastern Europe. Lastly,
the United States has acted as a promoter of democracy throughout the world in
situations were democracy would be beneficial to its security interests.
Despite the call for more research on external factors of democratization, often they
are given short shrift in studies of democratization for various reasons such as low
causal impact, difficulty in modeling and lack of data (Peceny 1999b; Williams and
Masters 2011). Although external forces may be marginalized in the literature, it is
in fact crucial to research the impacts of external factors as democracy promotion has
been on the foreign policy agenda of many western states in many different rhetorical
forms. Although some readers may argue that internal factors are more important to
democratization than external factors, I would answer that I am not arguing for their
supremacy in the causal story of democratization, but as they play a role, they should
be included in the discourse and analysis. Also, I argue, that the importance of
external factors may play a larger role depending on the type of regime transition the
polity experiences. If a state has externally imposed institutions or democratizes after
an international war through treaty, as was the case in Germany and Japan, external
factors may play a larger role in democratization. Haggard and Kaufman contend,
“external political and economic pressures from donors or great power patrons were
decisive in Comoros (1990), Cape Verde (1990), the Central African Republic (1993),
and Cyprus (1983)” (2012, 507). Thus, the inclusion of external factors is needed in
models and analyses of democratization.
External democratization may happen through diffusion, sanctions, aid conditional-
ity, democratic assistance, by force, or through imposition. Perhaps the most pas-
sive form of democratization is diffusion. Diffusion and demonstration effects are
the most passive of external methods of democratization. Under diffusion, states
become democratic through the influence of neighboring states (Helliwell 1994;
Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2007;
Elkink 2011). The states are able to observe the benefits of democratic norms and in-
stitutions within their democratic neighbors. Also, repeated interactions with demo-
cratic neighbors are likely to influence democratic regime change. States often seek
to promote democracy, or curb undemocratic behavior through sanctions or aid con-
ditionality. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990)found limited support for sanctions
affecting democratic change in the target. They conclude sanctions are more likely
to work, when the goals of the sanctions are modest and limited. States may seek to
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influence level of democracy through aid conditionality, under which states will pro-
vide aid only if the receiver complies with conditions set by the donor(Dreher 2009).
A slightly more active way to promote democratization in a target is through for-
eign assistance for democracy building, often referred to as democracy assistance
(Finkel, Perez Linan, and Seligson 2007). The United States, for instance, engages in
democracy assistance through funds from the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID). Continuing on the spectrum of actions used by the state to promote
democracy, is democracy promotion through intervention (Meernik 1996; Kegley
and Hermann 1997; Peceny 1999a,b; Pickering and Peceny 2006). This extreme
form of democratic manipulation may occur through either military or non-military
means.
2.3 Imposed Polities
There are a myriad of choices a state may employ to influence or precipitate a regime
change within another state. Polity imposition is the most extreme form of foreign
policy a state may use to achieve regime change. The use of polity imposition as a
strategy for a state to achieve a desired outcome is not new; states have used polity
imposition as a tool of foreign policy since antiquity. Thucydides, in the Melian Dia-
logue contained in the History of the Peloponnesian War, describes the conquering of the
islands of Melos because the Melians did not change their foreign policy to the satis-
faction of the Athenians. The Melians refused to renounce their alliance with Sparta.
Because the Melians failed to comply, the Athenians subjugated the island nation of
Melos (Thucydides 1998). More recently, governments were installed in Germany
and Japan by the Allied Powers after World War II. Careful attention was paid to
the structure of the new polities’ institutions so that political fractionalization would
not topple the fledgling governments. In addition to the creation of institutions, the
imposers fostered economic development (U.S. Library of Congress 2008a,b). Only
decades after World War II, Germany and Japan’s democracy was deeply entrenched
and their economies were strong. As a result, Germany and Japan are often held
as successful causes of imposed governments by policy-makers who advocate state-
building (Bush 2003; Dawisha 2004). Beyond the analogy, however, policy-makers
seldom draw contextual comparisons between Germany and Japan and modern im-
posed polities or potential targets. More specifically, policy-makers claim if demo-
cratic polity imposition was possible in Germany and Japan it is possible elsewhere
without indicating what policies and economic conditions are necessary to achieve
the desired outcome. Due to the prevalence and recurrence is it is important to study
systematically.
2.3.1 Imposed Polities
As the body of work addressing polity imposition is relatively new, there is not one
commonly used term used in the literature. The common theme among the defini-
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tions in the literature is that external actors seek to install political institutions in an
other state. In his his article, “Forcing Them to Be Free,” and book, Democracy at the
Point of Bayonets, Peceny “defines military intervention as the direct or indirect use of
military force focused on ‘changing or preserving the structure of political authority
in the target state’ Rosenau (1969, 161)” (1999b, 559). Similarly Owen identifies use
of force as mode through which states install or preserve institutions. He denotes
imposed polities as forcible domestic institutional promotion. He explains “domes-
tic institutional promotion is any effort by state A to create, preserve, or alter the
political institutions (as distinguished from the ruler or government) within state B”
(Owen 2002, 377). Institutional promotion may be used to create democratic and
authoritarian polities.
Not all polity impositions are achieved through the use of force. States may become
imposed polities through colonization, non-military coercion, military force, or inter-
national treaty. Enterline and Greig (2005b) expand the definition of polity imposition
to include imposition through nonmilitary means. They define an imposed polity as
a state whose government institutions have been created by foreign powers through
military or nonmilitary force. “Imposed democratic regimes are democratic govern-
ments installed by a foreign power in which the foreign power plays an important
role in the establishment, promotion, maintenance of the institutions of government”
(Enterline and Greig 2008a, 323). It is unlikely the that the polity would have devel-
oped as it had without outside influence. Enterline and Greig diverge from Owen
and Peceny’s definition in that the polity’s establishment is the result of outside in-
fluence. Under this definition post-colonial states are considered imposed polities
only if the colonizer constructed institutions in the polity. “ A state is considered an
imposed polity from the date of its imposition until it is replaced by a new polity
or it experiences a period of “interruption.”1 An imposed polity persists as long
as it maintains the institutions similar to its founding. However, during its lifes-
pan a polity’s democracy score may vary. Using the Polity IIId data set (McLaughlin
et al. 1998), Enterline and Greig identify the universe of imposed polities over the
time period 1806-1994. The data set provides a good guide for the identification
of imposed polities, but it is not without complications. For example, the new na-
tion variable coding rules may be misleading. Using just the data set’s criteria, all
independent African countries are included as examples of polities imposed by col-
onizers. This is problematic and may lead to the misidentification of imposed polity
cases. Not all colonizers left institutions or created new polities during decoloniza-
tion. some simply withdrew from their colony. Therefore, it is extremely important
to distinguish between colonies with institutions installed by the colonial powers and
those that did not. Only those former colonies with installed, democratic institutions
are considered imposed polities. After gathering their list of imposed polities from
Polity IIId , Enterline and Greig cross-checked the cases with The Encyclopedia of World
History (Stearns 2001) to distinguish between those polities whose institutions were
created by the colonial power and those whose institutions were indigenously created
1See Polity IIId data set for examples of interruption.
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by the newly independent state.As this project is concerned with applying lessons of
colonial legacy to modern imposed states, I use Enterline and Greig’s definition of
imposed polity for my inquiry.
2.3.2 Explaining Imposition
Other than explaining particular case studies, few scholars have systematically ex-
plored what leads states to impose polities within other states and the effects of
imposition, in terms of survival and success. In this section of my literature review, I
discuss work on what leads a state to impose a polity within another state. Second,
I explore the recent literature which explores the implications of polity imposition.
Imposing a polity within another state is an extreme form of intervention. States
have a range of choices to achieve foreign policy; why do states use a costly and
extreme form of foreign policy? Contemporary work on imposition investigates the
conditions under which one state is likely to replace the government in another state
(Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1996; Werner 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow 2003). In their book, The Logic of Political Survival, Bueno de
Mesquita and Siverson explain a state may change a leader within another state to
achieve their desired foreign policy outcome (1996). Werner contends that states will
impose a polity within another state when they have the opportunity and willingness
to install the polity. Werner operationalizes opportunity as the imposer possessing
enough power to defeat the rival in war. Opportunity alone is not sufficient for im-
position, under Werner’s argument. They must also be willing. Although a state
may have the opportunity to install a polity they may not be willing to engage in
state-building. A state is willing to impose a polity within a rival when they feel
that the rival poses a great threat to its security and the only way to neutralize the
threat is polity imposition. Werner (1996) reports that polity imposition in a de-
feated state after war significantly reduces threats from it to the conquering imposer.
Echoing Werner’s argument, Meernik (1996) asserts the United States involvement
in democratic promotion stems from security interests. Similarly, Williams and Mas-
ters identify democracy promotion as a “central security interest” for the U.S.(2011,
21). In other words, the United States is more likely to impose a polity in another
state if the target regime poses a security threat for the United States. As the United
States is one of the most active supporters of democracy promotion, several studies
address what leads to the country’s decision to engage in polity imposition and the
implications of such action
(Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999a,b; Dobbins 2003; Dobbins et al. 2003). Enterline
and Greig explain the puzzle, “the central benefit to the imposer lies in its poten-
tial for self-maintenance” (2008b, 884). The imposer may choose institutions which
are compatible with their desired outcomes, which eliminate “the necessity of overt
maintenance by the imposer in the form of repeated interventions” (2008b, 884). If
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the state is able to create a polity that will deliver consistent and desired outcomes, it
may be worth the hefty cost as opposed to interacting with another regime that may
not be as cooperative or transparent.
The United States has often engaged in interventionist foreign policy with the justi-
fication for the promotion of democracy. Democrat and Republican administrations
have expressed the desire to enlarge the democratic community, as well as, engaging
in interventions with that goal in mind. In the past, the United States has opted
for democracy promotion rather than “European-style colonial rule” (Peceny 1999a,
45). The puzzle of why the United State forcibly promotes democracy in through
military intervention is the focus of Peceny’s book, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets
(1999b). In some cases the United States promoted democracy through interven-
tion but in other cases it did not. In those cases the U.S. did the exact opposite by
supporting of authoritarian regimes and counterinsurgency groups. To resolve this
puzzle, Peceny used mixed-method analysis of case studies and statistical analysis.
The answer to whether the U.S. engages in pro-liberalization intervention lies in do-
mestic audience costs. If the domestic audience costs are higher than cost of violating
the U.S. democratic principles, presidents are likely to back down from intervention.
Domestic audience costs denote the political backlash encountered by the president
through the election box, if military action produces more casualties than the public
is willing to accept to achieve the foreign policy goal. This leads to a situation in
which, “presidents appear doomed to repeat the pattern of gradually escalating U.S.
involvement in these crises and then stepping away from the brink when it appears
that military force might be necessary to achieve a solution” (Peceny 1999a, 181). In-
sightfully, Peceny argues that this is an odd interaction between the liberal value of
democracy promotion and the liberal political institution of popular elections. Lastly,
he examines the impact of U.S. interventions and concludes U.S. military interven-
tions are unlikely to produce positive changes in democracy unless they employ
pro-liberalization policies in the intervention.
Although Peceny’s results are a good first step at testing the impact of military in-
terventions on democracy in the target. More work is needed to flesh out the causal
picture. First, Walker and Pearson (2007) point out Peceny’s democracy variable only
captures institutional democracy. They contend variables which capture democratic
performance such as human rights, political rights, and civil liberties would be a
better choice to capture the impact of interventions. Using these performance vari-
ables, Walker and Pearson do not find evidence that military interventions lead to
improvements in democratic performance. Thus, it seems the impact of intervention
with a presidential statement of support for free and fair elections, leads to what
appears to be improvements at an institutional level, but fails to translate to actual
democratic performance. Secondly, Peceny advances the modeling of intervention
by including time in his model. However, his use of snapshots of time to capture
change in democracy create a problem teasing out the causal picture as there are
many confounding factors.
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Changing the focus from United States efforts to promote democracy, Owen’s work
on imposed polities broadens both the imposers the cases covered and the time pe-
riod. Owen (2002)is among the first researchers to study imposed polities systemat-
ically. His 2002 article provides a descriptive analysis of 198 cases of forcible polity
imposition from the fourteenth century until the twentieth century. As previously
mentioned, polity imposition has happened regularly throughout modern history.
Owen concludes that polity imposition is not a rare event in the international sys-
tem. He concludes polity imposition is more likely to occur during times of ideolog-
ical tension and international insecurity. His findings lend support to Werner and
Meernik’s conclusions that insecurity will drive a state to impose a polity. Owen
(2002), similar to Werner’s argument, explains that at such times of tension, the need
for states to expand power interacts with their desire to keep or put ideological allies
in power in the target state. Once a state decides to impose a polity, Owen explains
they are likely to impose institutions similar to their own in the target state. Installing
similar institutions to those of the imposer may be more attractive since the imposer
has extensive, first-hand knowledge of such institutions. For example, the British
set up British tutelage systems in their colonies because they understood the bene-
fits of the institutions, which allowed for delegation of power to local agents. The
imposition of democratic institutions facilitate transparency. However, as Owen cau-
tions, democracies do not always install democracies. If the imposing state wishes
to achieve stability within the imposed polity it may install an authoritarian state
that is less likely to buckle under interest overload which may overwhelm fledgling
democracies.
2.3.3 Effects of Imposition
More recent studies of polity imposition focus on outcomes of polity imposition
rather than on the decision to impose a polity. As discussed in imposed polity def-
initions, one way for a state to impose a polity is through military interventions.
Many interventions are justified on the basis of spreading democracy. But do those
interventions work? Examining 64 U.S. military interventions between 1945 and 1992
that were designed to protect or promote democracy, Hermann and Kegley, seek to
answer the previous question. Their results indicate military intervention is an effec-
tive tool for encouraging democratic reform in the target. They point out, “past U.S.
interventions have more often worked toward enlarging, rather than restricting the
liberal democratic community” (1998, 108). The authors anticipate a possible criti-
cism that democratization is mainly an internal phenomenon, they concede interven-
tion is only one part of the democratization causal puzzle and they do not control for
all factors which may influence democratic change. Further caution should be taken
when applying these results to foreign policy practice, as there may be a selection
bias. In other words, the United States may only engage in democratic enlarging
interventions when it is most likely to succeed. In part due to the potential costs,
both material and audience costs involved in such actions.Similar to Hermann and
20 Literature Review
Kegley’s results, Peceny’s analysis of U.S. military interventions, lends support to
the argument that interventions by that state can have a positive effect of democracy
in the target (1999b, 577). However, this positive effect is limited to cases in which
U.S. intervention supported free and fair elections within the target of the interven-
tion. Similar to previous work in this area, Meernik (1996) assesses the ability of
American, military interventions to facilitate democratization within other states. In
contrast to Hermann and Kegley’s findings, he finds U.S. military interventions do
not lead to short-term democratic improvements in the target. Interestingly, cases
where the president released statements supporting democracy experienced a short-
term increase of democratization.
Walker and Pearson (2007), while acknowledging Peceny’s contribution towards our
understanding of democratic interventions, question the strength of the findings
presented in his article “Forcing Them to Be Free” (1999b). In their replication of
Peceny’s findings that U.S. military interventions followed by free and fair elections
in the target, Walker and Pearson conclude the “’forcing them to be free’ variable
is highly contextual and dependent upon the cases that are included” (2007, 51).
Thus, the results found by Peceny may not be generalizable to other democratizing
interventions. Secondly expanding the model, they test the impact of democratic
interventions on other measures of democratic performance. Included in the analy-
sis are human rights, political rights, and civil liberties. Their analysis revealed no
relationship between democratic interventions and the improvement of democratic
success beyond free and fair elections. Hostile interventions do not lead towards the
establishment of a broad range of democratic outcomes in the target. The authors
conclude hostile interventions to advance democracy cannot be seen to be an effec-
tive tool of foreign policy to establish and promote democracies in other countries.
The authors call for more sophisticated models such as hazard models to capture
models rather than an arbitrary year as used by Peceny in his analysis. Despite their
criticisms, they see “Forcing Them to Be Free” as an important piece in the dialogue
to assess the ability of interventions to advance democratic rights.
Pickering and Peceny (2006) move beyond American military interventions to include
other liberal democracies as well as the United States. Using a sample of military in-
terventions by the U.S., U.K., France, and the United Nations over the time period
1946 to 1996, the authors analyzed whether the actions led to a positive change of
democracy in the target. Limited evidence exists for the America’s ability to affect
democratic change in their target. Caution should be used in applying the results.
As they explain, the results are mainly driven by cases in the Caribbean Basin. Over-
all, they do not find support indicating intervention by liberal states produce more
democratic targets. On the other hand, interventions headed by the United Nations
are more likely to produce changes in democracy(Pickering and Peceny 2006, 555).
The authors call for more work on democracy promotion through polity imposition,
both empirical and in-depth case studies to help arrive an a better understanding of
the impact of democratic interventions.
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In more recent work on military intervention, Williams and Masters (2011) evalu-
ate the successful of military intervention as a tool to promote democracy in other
states. Building on work in the aggressive democracy promotion and adding to the
external democratization literature, they constructed a data set of military interven-
tions by conventional forces of consolidated democracies2, where the intention of the
action is to promote democracy. Using public statements from the New York Times,
BBC, Foreign Relations Documents of the United States (FRUS), and the United Nations
Online Document Archive, to determine whether the decision to intervene included
democratic intentions. Their analysis suggest that “democratically intended mili-
tary interventions” were not successful in achieving democratic change in the target.
And yet, interventions which are directed against the current government and po-
litical elite did lead to democratic changes in the polity of the target. Furthermore,
their results provide confirmatory evidence that previous democratic history is cor-
related with positive changes in democratization after the intervention (Williams and
Masters 2011, 32). The authors caution that their results do not resolve the debate
regarding whether intervention is an effective method of democracy promotion, but
adds to the discussion of external forces and their role in democratization. Rather
than democratization, they point out “the direct outcome of military intervention
appears to be (at this point) a weakened state rather than a democratized state”
(Williams and Masters 2011, 34). Williams and Masters question the utility of ag-
gressive democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool. However, they highlight the
need for more research on the impact of military intervention on democratization,
as well as, the need for more work on how external factors may influence internal
mechanisms of democratization.
Expanding the measures used to capture democratic success, Walker (2011) includes
two measures of democratic success to capture not only the typically studied proce-
dural democracy but also substantive democracy. Walker employs the Political Terror
Scale (PTS) to capture the provision of human rights within the target. The assess-
ment of both variables follows the argument that it is not enough that states possess
the institutions of democracy; the state must actively engage in the provision and
protection of human rights. Through his analysis he tests whether democratizing in-
terventions have a long-term impact on democratic success of the target. In addition
to the expanded democratic success measure, Walker includes three different types of
democratizing interventions: interventions with post-intervention liberalizing poli-
cies, interventions with liberalizing intent, and interventions to impose democracy.
Unfortunately, regardless of type, hostile, democratic interventions very rarely have
an impact on democratic success within the target. However, Walker cautions more
work is needed to capture the full picture of the impact of democratic interventions.
In particular, he advocates future researchers to include internal contextual factors of
the target in hazard models to build upon Enterline and Greig’s work (Walker 2011).
Overall, the authors included in this section, highlight the need for more research on
2Williams and Masters denote a consolidated democracy as any state with a Polity score of 6 or
greater on the Polity IVd scale.
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intervention as an external factor of democratization.
Next, I discuss the effects of polity imposition through military and non-military
means. Enterline and Greig demonstrate the need for systematic studies of the im-
pacts of imposition as many policy-makers hold Germany and Japan as examples of
successful imposition.
“Postwar Germany and Japan are generally considered exemplars of the
successful cultivation of democratic institutions by foreign powers. Yet
emphasis on the end-product of these impositions - stable, prosperous,
peaceful , and democratic societies - minimizes acknowledgment of the
risks and difficulties required to transform the political systems in these
two states following World War II” (2008b, 909).
The use of Germany and Japan as analogies that polity imposition can successfully
achieve foreign policy outcomes desired by the imposers under-emphasizes the dif-
ficulties faced by the imposer and the target state. Setting up new states, especially
democracies may be problematic and the benefits of the new polity may not be as
forthcoming, or as abundant, as policy-maker’s anticipate. There is evidence that
imposed polities are fragile over their entire existence and may not deliver the policy
results policy-makers promise (Enterline and Greig 2005a, 2008a,b). Even if the im-
poser is successful in imposing a polity within a state, it may not achieve its foreign
policy objectives.
Policy-makers have argued that the installation of democracy will lead to democracy,
prosperity, and peace within the region of target state. Under this argument, the
imposed democracy serves as a “beacon of hope” for democracy within its locality.
Enterline and Greig (2005a) test the relationship between democratic polity position
and regional conflict and economic development. They separate their sample of im-
posed democracies into two categories: bright and dim beacons. The term beacons
is used as policy-makers suggest a democracy in a region will serve as a beacon to
inspire democratization in neighboring states. Bright beacons are strong democra-
cies while dim beacons are weak democracies. Bright beacons, according to their
duration analysis, are correlated with regional peace and higher levels of economic
development in the region. However, and most importantly, their results indicate
dim beacons, polities with weak democratic institutions, are associated with regional
instability and do not promote regional prosperity or democratization (Enterline and
Greig 2005a, 1095). Given that most new democracies are likely to be dim beacons,
Enterline and Greig’s results support the argument that benefits of imposition may
take quite a bit of time and work by the imposer.
Continuing their work on imposed polities, Enterline and Greig, construct a pooled-
cross-sectional time series model of 43 democratic, imposed polities to determine
whether the analogies of German and Japan are applicable to Iraq and Afghanistan
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(2008a). To put it another way, they assess the prospects for the democratic futures
of Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to imposition practices the economic and so-
cial setting in which they are installed is very important for the future of a polity.
Thus, their argument follows, due to the lower levels of economic development in
Iraq and Afghanistan than those in Germany and Japan, imposing a stable, demo-
cratic polities in Iraq and Afghanistan poses a much greater challenge. The authors
develop a simulation to model conditions in post-invasion Iraq and what challenges
posed to Iraq’s polity.Their results provide confirmatory evidence of the argument.
They report the future of successful democracy “in post invasion Afghanistan and
Iraq is poor at best” (Enterline and Greig 2008a, 346). They conclude that Iraq, and
Afghanistan, are likely to face on-going, domestic political challenges which are diffi-
cult to stop. The key, they argue, to halting domestic political challenges in imposed
polities is to address them early in the polity’s existence (2008b).
A myriad of challenges contribute to the frailty of imposed polities. Earlier research
by Enterline and Greig (2005a) indicated imposed democratic polities are more fragile
than democratizing states, their 2008 article revisits the question of fragility of im-
posed polities. In the argument, they argue consideration of imposers polity choices
is not enough to analyze potential instability of the target, but social and economic
conditions prior to the imposition are equally as important. Findings of their anal-
ysis indicate the greater the population and ethnic heterogeneity in a state the more
likely it is to encounter domestic political challenges (2008b, 899). Additionally, past
history provides insight for the future of the polity. The results reveal colonially im-
posed polities in the post-war period are more likely to experience domestic political
challenges. Likewise, states which were imposed after a defeat in war during that
time period, are likely to encounter domestic political challenges(2008b, 904).
Enterline and Greig’s result regarding colonial imposed polities and instability may
be driven by the use of a dichotomous variable to capture the impact of colonial
legacy. The colonial experience is coded 1 for imposed polities which were created
through imposed institutions during their colonization. In their argument, they as-
sert colonial impositions are likely to be more stable as they have more time, or
experience, with their institutions. Unfortunately, the dichotomous variable does not
capture this relationship. Such a measure can only capture whether a polity was
colonized, it does not account for the amount of time the polity has had with the
institutions. Installation of institutions varied by colonizer and even among each
colonizer’s dependencies, the appropriate variable should capture that relationship.
However, their result regarding colonial legacy does tell us about the general rela-
tionship between imposition through colonization and instability. The colonial rela-
tionship alone is not enough to contribute to stability, there may be another causal
factor which works through colonization, such as time with the institutions, which
may contribute to greater stability. I discuss colonial legacy in greater depth in the
next section. explore the institutional arguments outlined in the literature which
explains why British colonies are more likely to persist than other colonies.
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2.4 Colonial Legacy
Thus far, this review has outlined research on democratization and polity imposi-
tion. Although empirical literature on imposed polities is just starting to amass a
body of work, there is a great deal of literature on colonial legacy. As discussed
in the previous section, according to Enterline and Greig’s definition, colonies with
imposed institutions are a subset of imposed polities. Colonial impositions are dif-
ferent than those imposed after wars or through intervention. “Colonial impositions
generally occur over an extended period, one that can facilitate the elimination of
threatening political groups, the establishment of civil administration, and the devel-
opment of political norms” (Enterline and Greig 2008b, 886). The conceptualization
of colonial, imposed polities in this project does not include British settler colonies
nor European internal colonies as the colonial legacies of the two types of colonies
were vastly different. British settler colonies often enjoyed the “broad privileges of
home rule” (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 227). Also, “European in-
ternal colonies did not experience modernity as an imposition in the same way that
overseas colonies did” (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 227) In part, lib-
eral institutions were installed to govern the colony as there was not population of
settlers to serve in colonial government. It is those liberal institutions which produce
the beneficial, institutional structure and norms that contributed to later democratic
persistence after independence. Studies on colonial legacy indirectly test the impact
of built, liberal institutions and colonization practices on democratic persistence.
2.4.1 Effects of Colonization
Decolonization in the postwar era led to the creation of many new democratic poli-
ties. Some of the new democracies failed, while others persisted years after indepen-
dence. Some of the new polities survived, while the others failed. Extant research
indicates colonial legacy plays an important role in the survival of democratic poli-
ties. Researchers of colonial legacy assert understanding of colonial history is neces-
sary to understand contemporary social and political conditions of former colonies
(Hadenius 1992; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992a; Lipset, Seong, and
Torres 1993; Mamdani 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Abernathy 2000; Bernhard,
Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Early research on colonial legacy focused on the
negative effects former colonies. Colonialism has been linked to government instabil-
ity, dependency, and low economic growth. Early research on colonial legacy demon-
strated the link between colonial practices and low levels of economic development.
In addition, democratic, former colonies are less likely to survive post-independence
than other democratizing states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). This
may seem at odds with the previous assertion institutions and some colonial prac-
tices are associated with post-independence survival. I will explore the arguments
in turn, after I discuss the early research on the impacts of colonial legacy in this
section.
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Colonial experience produced long-lasting effects in the colonized country (Conteh-
Morgan 1997; Brown 1999; Abernathy 2000; Posner 2003; Bernhard, Reenock, and
Nordstrom 2004). For example, Africa’s problems have roots in colonial experience.
Mamdani explains, “key to understanding the state in contemporary Africa is the
historical fact that it was forged in the course of colonial occupation” (1996, 62). To
adequately identify post-independence issues, an examination of the colonial period
is needed. Poor economic development is often associated with colonial past, which
I will discuss in the next section.
One of the most researched areas on colonial legacy is concerned with its effect on
economic development. Dependency theory associates colonial legacy with lower
levels of economic development of the colonizers. This is due to the colonizers not
considering the impact of colonial practices post-independence. In many arguments,
the colonizer is portrayed as a predatory state(Abernathy 2000). Colonizers were of-
ten more concerned with short-term gains from the colony rather than the long-term
well-being of colony or subsequent polity. Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978)trace the
disparity in economic development back to the economic practices of colonizers in
their pursuit for raw materials. Colonizers were not interested in creating institu-
tions beyond those that assisted with the extraction of resources. Resource extrac-
tion was common in South American and African colonies(Bernhard, Reenock, and
Nordstrom 2004). The experience of colonies which were established for resource
extraction was very different than those in settler colonies, such as the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Bernhard,
Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Grier 1999).
Due to low levels of economic development, former colonies are more dependent on
exports of primary goods than other states. As a result, some polities are more likely
to suffer from price fluctuations on the world market (Furtado 1965; Robinson 1979;
Tomlinson 1999). Their vulnerability to the world market has a negative impact on
economic growth. With lower levels of economic development and vulnerability to
the market, former colonies are at greater risk of democratic failure (Diamond, Linz,
and Lipset 1995; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001).
In addition to negatively affecting the economy of the former colony, some colonizers
reinforced existing social cleavages to their benefit (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978;
Posner 2003). Those social cleavages such as religious or ethnic fractionalization,
have lasting impacts on the likelihood of the polity’s survival in the post-colonial pe-
riod (Enterline and Greig 2008a). For example, during Uganda’s colonial period, the
political system favored the Baganda people. The constitutional changes prior to in-
dependence did not resolve the fractionalization of Uganda. The reforms the colonial
governor, Andrew Cohen, implemented to facilitate independence and unification
led to a division between factions in Buganda and those fearful of Baganda domi-
nation. The new constitution further exacerbated the division by granting Buganda
and the Baganda people a special position and status in Uganda (Mittelman 1975;
U.S. Library of Congress 1992; Rubongoya 2007).
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In some cases ethnic groups were divided into different polities. While in other
cases, conflicting ethnic groups were drawn into the same polity (Diamond 1993).
Nigeria is an example of a territorial entity that did not exist until European coloniza-
tion in 1903. Over the state’s history Nigeria had 25-400 ethnic groups of different
cultures and modes of political organization (U.S. Library of Congress 1991). To
facilitate British colonial rule, the ethnic groups were drawn together in one state.
The name Nigeria was adopted due to the river Niger that ran through the terri-
tory (U.S. Library of Congress 1991). Administrative and political reasons were
the primary drivers for colonial borders. Little or no attention was paid to precolo-
nial boundaries(Diamond 1988a). The ethnic cleavages, previously discussed further
complicate chances for survival after independence. If the colonizers gave one group
higher economic privileges based on ethnicity, social fragmentation is likely to con-
tribute to the polity failure (Abernathy 2000). Ethnic rivalries, for example, have
been a consistent source of instability in Nigeria since independence (U.S. Library of
Congress 1991). Ethnic fractionalization, dependent economies and poor economic
growth has haunted former colonies long after the colonizing power left the country.
Although research of colonial legacy indicate colonial practices led to numerous
problems in the post-independence period, other studies indicate colonial legacy
produced some positive effects in the former dependencies. Following the large
amount of research examining the relationship between colonial legacy and devel-
opment, scholars added to the literature by examining other corollaries to colonial
legacy through the use of systematic studies (e.g., Mamdani 1996; Grier 1999; Blan-
ton, Mason, and Athow 2001). The new studies, which I explore in greater detail
through the next subsections, revealed that colonial legacy may have some positive
impact on former dependencies after independence. The positive outcomes of col-
onization were not designed for altruistic reasons, rather power-sharing institutions
were introduced to ease colonial administration, as a response to resistance or a way
to continue the beneficial relationship after independence. Although the colonizers
did not intend to export democratization, they did bring power-sharing institutions
to their colonies(Hariri 2012). The British were among the most likely to install
power-sharing institutions.
2.4.2 Identity of Colonizer
2.4.2.1 Why Identity of the Colonizer Matters
More recent colonial legacy research indicates that the nature of colonial history’s
impact is dependent on the colonizer of the polity. The argument that western colo-
nial experience is completely detrimental to democratic survival is misleading. To
truly assess the impact of colonial legacy on democratic survival, the identity of the
colonizer must be considered as western powers ruled their colonies very differently.
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In other words, post-colonial experience varied based on which state served as the
colonizer.
The identity of the colonizer must be considered, as different western powers used
various methods and institutions to manage their dependencies. Some colonizers
merely extracted wealth, whereas others were more likely to foster economic devel-
opment of the colony. For instance, Belgium extracted resources from the Congo
and did not foster economic development. By contrast, the British encouraged eco-
nomic development in their colonies when such development would produce greater
benefits of the United Kingdom. Conteh-Morgan (1997) described the different colo-
nization practice of the colonizers. British were more likely to employ indirect rule.
Although the French installed some power-sharing institutions, they used more di-
rect rule to mange their colonies. An economic paternalist approach was used by
the Belgians in their colonies while the Portuguese colonized using an oppressive as-
similist method (Conteh-Morgan 1997). Among the colonies, the British and French
colonies were more likely to have the most liberal institutions or continuous pressure
for democracy (Diamond 1988b). Consequently, the effects of colonial legacy are
not the same for all colonies. The effects of their colonial past is highly dependent
on which colonizer administered the polity (Conteh-Morgan 1997; Diamond 1988b;
Grier 1999). Economic development is also influenced by the different practices used
by the colonizers . Research indicates French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Belgian colo-
nial legacy has a negative impact on polities after independence (Huntington 1984;
Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). Grier explains, “the British, French, and Spanish
had very different colonial philosophies. It is perhaps not surprising that the former
British colonies have performed significantly better in the post-colonial era, given the
fact that British decentralization and flexibility allowed colonies to adopt the institu-
tions that best suited their situation” (1999, 320). Later, I will discuss the arguments
about how indirect rule and strong civic institutions contribute to the persistence of
the polity after independence. Lastly, although it can be said that colonizers have
colonization patterns, the creation of liberal institutions was not uniformly across all
colonies, which I will discuss this further in Chapter 3.
In their 2004 article, Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) test the relationship
between colonial legacy and democratic survival. To test other factors which con-
tribute to polity survival, they investigated the effect of economic development, social
fragmentation, and the relationship between state and civil society on the duration
of post-colonial democracies. They argue the relationship between state and civil so-
ciety is related to the likelihood of democratic polity survival in the post-colonial pe-
riod. Importantly, the relationship between government survival and colonial legacy
is dependent upon the colonizer. Building on colonial legacy literature, authors’
assert British colonies differed from other colonies because the British were more
likely to set up strong, civic institutions. Their general findings suggest that for-
mer colonies are likely to be underdeveloped and suffer from social fragmentation
(Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 240). In turn, underdevelopment and
social fragmentation is correlated with polity failure. However, when they separate
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the cases by colonizer, their results indicate British colonies transitioning to democ-
racy are more likely to survive than French or Dutch colonies (Bernhard, Reenock,
and Nordstrom 2004, 240). Their results indicate, when grouped together without
grouping by colonizer, former colonies are more likely to fail than other democ-
ratizing states, which is consistent with previous arguments in the colonial legacy
literature. Once different colonization patterns are accounted for by including a vari-
able to capture identity of the colonizer, their results lend support to the argument
that institutions created by the British are beneficial to democratic survival after in-
dependence.
It is important to note Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom do not directly test the
institutional argument, but use a dichotomous variable to denote whether the colony
was a British dependency or not. Although their results are an advancement of our
knowledge of colonial legacy, more work, as they suggest is needed to understand
the relationship between institutions, civil society, and democratic persistence.
I will explore the arguments regarding the benefits of British colonial legacy in
greater detail later, but first I will discuss French colonial practices.
2.4.2.2 French Colonial Practices
The British were not the only colonizers to install liberal measures and institutions
in their dependencies. The French also used some liberal measures in their colo-
nization(Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). It is important to note, French
colonial practice was not uniform; each colony’s degree of autonomy varied (Mam-
dani 1996; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004).As mentioned previously, the
French were more likely to use association rather than assimilation as their colo-
nial approach (Mamdani 1996; Williams and Masters 2011). An associational ap-
proach denotes a strong relationship with the colonizer in which native institutions
were retained (Betts 1960). Whereas under an assimilation approach to coloniza-
tion, the colonies works to transform the colony to become a “detached segment of
the “mother country.” (Betts 1960, 53). At first the French adopted an assimilist
approach but later changed to one of association. Williams and Masters explain,
“France originally had no intent to sever ties with its African colonial acquisitions; it
was simply going to make them French” (2011, 20). However, as pressure mounted
to decolonize, France changed its policy to association rather than assimilation by
installing democratic institutions in its dependencies. In many French colonies en-
franchisement rights were given and elections were conducted shortly before inde-
pendence (Zolberg 1966; Morgenthau 1970). The change in method have been linked
with post-colonial problems.
French reforms did not always lead to successful democratic persistence. Colonial
French legacy may not be as positive as some studies suggest, argues Collier (1982).
The practice of direct rule did not allow for reforms tailored to the colonies. “The
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consequence of this philosophy was a centralization of power in Paris and an auto-
cratic system of colonial government that did not leave governors much freedom or
latitude in dealing with local problems” (Grier 1999, 319). The use of centralization
contributed to economic problems after independence. Grier further argues, “While
centralization and bureaucratisation may have helped the Spanish to gain a foothold
in the New World, and allowed the French to pursue the ‘republican ideal’ in West
Africa, it may have established colonial institutions and customs that were not con-
ducive to development and growth after the colonial period” (1999, 320). Previously
mentioned as a benefit of French colonization, Collier (1982) suggests elections prior
to independence contributed to the prevalence of one party regimes in former French
colonies in the post-colonial era.
2.4.2.3 British Colonial Practices
As described earlier in the identity of the colonizer section of the literature review,
British colonies are more likely to survive in the post-colonial era (Blondel 1972) and
are more likely to be successful democracies (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984; Dia-
mond 1988b; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993). Bollen and
Jackman’s analysis indicate British legacy is correlated with higher level of democ-
racy in 1960 and 1965(Bollen and Jackman 1985, 34). In many of their colonies,
the British faced the challenge of diverse populations with many ethnic groups. De-
spite the heterogeneous populations, British colonies live longer than other colonies.
Lange (2003) asserts colonial legacy explains post-colonial success despite the poten-
tial complications of ethnic heterogeneity. In addition to dampening complications
from ethnic heterogeneity, British colonial legacy is associated with higher levels
of economic development. Economic development was positively fostered through
British colonial practices. “British colonialism introduced a rule of law, effective ad-
ministration, and competitive markets, promoting development in the post-colonial
period” (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006, 414). Lange attributes the economic
success of Mauritius to the institutions created during the colonial period.
From my review of the British colonial legacy literature, I observed the benefits of
colonial experience can be divided into four overlapping camps: indirect rule, insti-
tutions, civic culture, and infrastructure.The most commonly cited benefit of colonial
legacy is their use of indirect rule. Bollen and Jackman contend the democratic
success of former British colonies is tied to the use of indirect rule (Bollen and Jack-
man 1985, 34). The British were more likely to use customary institutions and the
populace for public rule in their colonies than other colonizers (Cell 1999). In ad-
dition, the British tailored administrations as best fit the colony. According to Grier,
“After 1765, the British did not automatically impose their constitution on the in-
digenous culture, but tried to individualize each country’s constitution to its specific
needs” (1999, 319). By 1920, indirect rule was the cornerstone of British colonial
policy. During the interwar period, Mamdani explains, indirect rule was a colonial
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reform in response to resistance in African colonies (1996). The use of indirect rule
as response to discontent was used in other colonies as well. The Government of
India Act 1935 was create in response to discontent (Reference Division Central Of-
fice of Information 1977). As a result of the reforms, through the introduction of
the middle class, the social base of indirect rule was broadened. Overall, Collier’s
(1982) results indicate the use of indirect rule encouraged slightly better democratic
performance than other states in the post-colonial period. Indirect rule was often
created through the installation of institutions, which I will discuss in greater depth
in the next section.
As a result of their experience with democratic institutions, British colonies are better
prepared for democracy in the post-colonial era. Evidence to support this argument
can be found in several studies of the relationship between British colonial legacy and
stable, long-lasting democracy (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985;
Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Johnson explains the introduction of elec-
toral rights and elections in Caribbean colonies led to the creation of more institu-
tions. “Across the British Caribbean, the gradual introduction of representation gov-
ernment overlapped with the development of viable trade unions and political par-
ties which provided much of the driving force for constitutional change” (1999, 17).
The argument outlined in the literature contends the experience with civil adminis-
tration and bureaucracies enable the states to weather the democratic growing-pains
many new democracies face (Hyam 1999; Enterline and Greig 2008b). However,
the amount and deepness of the institutions varied according to how heavily they
settled the region. Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006)question the universality
of institution creation across British colonies. The number of liberal institutions var-
ied among colonies; some had a large amount of institutions while others had few
imposed liberal institutions (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006).
In the literature, the institutions and practices installed by the British in their colonial
is often referred to as the British Model. Weiner reports that there are two compo-
nents of the British model: (1) rule of law through effective bureaucratic and judicial
institutions and (2) the “provision for some system of representation and election
(Weiner 1987, 8). He argues the components provided the elites an opportunity to
engage with and experience democratic government (Weiner 1987). Therefore, it was
not just institutions which had a positive benefits, but the institutions fostered civic
culture within the colony as well. I will discuss civic culture in the next paragraph.
Colonial experience with imposed institutions encourages democratic political norms
in the colony(Enterline and Greig 2008b). The benefits of British colonial legacy stem
from the cultivation of a stronger civil society assert Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens (1992a). Stronger civil society grew as the colonial liberal institutions did
not allow elites to use the institutions as tools of repression of their opposition and
lower classes. “The effects of British colonialism deviated from this negative pattern
in so far as the colonial presence prevented the dominant classes from using the state
apparatus to repress the emerging organizations of subordinate classes. Instead it
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allowed for the gradual emergence of a stronger civil society, capable of sustaining
democracy after independence (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992b, 2).
For example, British land policy placed the authority of the British over elite interests
(Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006). Civic culture, Lange further explained, was
strengthened during the colonial period through engagement with social actors and
strengthening of institutions. Another way the British promoted civic culture within
the colony was through the aforementioned use of tailoring of constitutions and
practices to suite each colonies needs (Grier 1999).
Lastly, the British were more likely than other colonizers to create infrastructure.
Although the infrastructure was primarily created to facilitate colonization, it has
provided lasting benefits. A common argument in the literature, contends the infras-
tructure build by the British facilitated democracy in the post-colonial era. Infrastruc-
ture mentioned in the literature include: education, transportation, communication,
structured and trained bureaucracies, which relied on local personal Von der Mehden
(1964); Moore (1966); Dahl (1971); Weiner (1987); Diamond (1988b); Hadenius (1992);
Brown (1999); Abernathy (2000) According to British education policy, subjects were
taught in vernacular language and often trained indigenous leaders. Grier explains,
“British colonial education policies made a conscious effort to avoid alienating the
native culture, by teaching in the vernacular languages and training teachers from
indigenous tribes” (1999, 319). This sensitivity to indigenous culture and groups,
reinforced the construction of civic culture.
Some researchers doubt the positive benefits of British colonial legacy. Benefits of
British indirect rule for democratic survival may be overstated (Herbst 2000). Herbst
contends the differences between British and French techniques of colonialism may
not be as great as argued in the literature. Extensions of previous studies, have not
been successful in producing comparable results. Using Bollen and Jackman’s (1985)
model, Lipset, Seong, and Torres (1993) extend the cases covered from 1975 to 1985.
They report they did not find a correlation between British Colonial Legacy and
democratization for the years 1980 and 1985 (1993, 16). Hadenius’s work on the im-
pact of colonial legacy indicates that other factors may drive the correlation between
colonial legacy and democracy. Hadenius adds level of economic development and
number of Protestants in the colony to the colonial legacy model. After the inclusion
of the variables, he found there was no correlation between British colonial legacy
and level of democratization (1992). A potential explanation for the competing re-
sults in the literature is the variations found in colonization practices of the British.
Although the British used common practices across their colonies. They were not
uniformly applied in the same institutions and at the same time period. Samatar
(1997) explains Although the term “British Model” is often used in the literature,
British colonial experience varied across colonies (Samatar 1997). These doubts in-
dicate that data and research on contextual factors, which capture the variations in
practices, is needed to assess the relationship between colonial legacy and democratic
survival. In the next section, I examine the differences between British and French
colonial practices.
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2.4.2.4 Difference Between British and French Colonial Practices
Despite both colonizers installing democratic institutions within their dependencies,
there were important differences between the colonists. As discussed previously,
the British were more likely to indirectly rule their colonies while the French were
more likely to directly rule (Conteh-Morgan 2001). The use of indirect, rather than
direct rule, accounts for the slightly better democratic performance in British colonies
(Collier 1982).
Citizens in French colonies also had opportunities to participate in their governance,
but did not have as many liberal institutions as the British colonies. Unlike the
British, normally French colonies were ruled by a French governor and authority
figures of the colony were only used at the lowest level of colonial government. In
some cases, such as Benin, the French dismantled existing political structures and in-
stalled a direct, colonial government. British colonial practices allowed the citizenry
of the colony to elect local assemblies, where French colonies enjoyed symbolic rep-
resentation to the parliament of France. “Election of local assemblies were more
important,” suggests Abernathy, “to post-colonial survival than ’symbolic’ represen-
tation in the Assembleé Nationale” (2000, 638). Mamdani’s study of colonization in
Africa revealed the British were more likely to have treaties and alliances with rulers
of precolonial kingdoms whereas the French were often in conflict with the rulers.
For example, British worked out alliances and treaties in Nigeria and Uganda. On the
other hand, when actors refused to submit to the French, the French were more likely
to use suppression. For example, when the military leader Samory Touré refused to
acquiesce to French demands, they used military actions to force compliance (1996).
The British provided education programs as part of their colonial practice, whereas
in very few groups in French colonies received colonial education and those that
did were isolated and only allowed to speak French (Grier 1997). Observations by
Grier (1999) indicate at the point of decolonization in Africa, the citizenry in British
colonies were more education than those of French colonies.
Despite the positive impact of British colonial legacy on institutions, British colonies
are more likely to experience ethnic conflict in the post-colonial era than French
colonies (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). Blanton, Mason, and Athow find ev-
idence that the decentralized system of government by the British fostered ethnic
group competition, while the centralized French system discouraged such competi-
tion and encouraged assimilation. The decentralized structure of British colonialism
allowed traditional authorities and institutions to exist and compete for power. Cri-
tiquing the positive benefits of colonial legacy in Africa, Collier (1982)contends nei-
ther the British nor the French produced favorable conditions for economic growth
and persistence in Africa. However, he concedes the use of indirect rule by the
British encouraged slightly better democratic performance by laying the groundwork
for multiparty rule. The positive benefits of institutions for democracy is not just a
post-colonial phenomenon. Institutions are linked with democratic survival. In the
next section of this literature review, I examine the factors which are associated with
democratic survival.
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External factors or democratization are an under studied area of democratization.
Neighboring states, alliances, trade relationships, sanctions, conflict and polity im-
position have played a role in the democratizing of other states. Thus it is important
to include external factors in models of democratization. External factors remain an
understudied component in studies of the growth of democracy. I do not argue ex-
ternal factors should supplant internal factors but should be included in studies as
they play a part in the transition to and maintenance of democratic polities. Without
the inclusion researchers are left with an incomplete picture of how democracies
are created and survive. Of interest in th is project is the impact a state has within
another state through the imposition of liberal institutions.
The polity imposition literature has added to the discussion of the most extreme form
of external democratization. Although great strides have been made, more work is
needed to determine what leads to long-lasting, stable imposed polities. To this date,
research on specific imposed institutions has not been conducted beyond distinctions
between autocracy and democracy. To understand how imposition affects polities
over the long term, data on specific built institutions is needed. With the inclusion
of imposed institutions in models of polity imposition, a deeper understanding of
how different types of democratic institutions affect polity survival can be gained.
Additionally, gathering information on institutions created allows for investigation
of how different institutions interact with each other and are reinforced through
repeated interaction. As democratic institutions are often built over time,
Most research involving the British colonial legacy seeks to identify why democracies
which were once British colonies are more likely to last longer than other colonies,
and even other democratizing states. Specifically, the institutions and power sharing
practices used by the British are associated with persistence in the post-colonial pe-
riod. It may therefore be advantageous to investigate how institutions and power
sharing affect democratic survival after independence. However, current studies
have not included liberal institutions in models to assess that relationship. Rather
researchers have used indirect measures such as identity of the colonizer as a proxy
variable which has yielded mixed findings. Therefore, future investigation using
measures of imposed institutions would be helpful to better understand the effects
of colonizer built institutions on democratic survival after independence. This project
serves to fill that gap in the literature by introducing institutional variables into the
study of democratic survival. The introduction of built institutions allows the focus
to shift from the identity of the colonizer to the institutions which are the hypothe-
sized causal factors.
In subsequent chapters, I will outline my data set which I use to capture institu-
tional experience of imposed polities through colonization. Next, I directly test the
institutional argument. Second, I test whether the amount of experience with the in-
stitutions answers the contending results in the polity imposition and colonial legacy
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literature. Lastly, I use sequence analysis to better understand the process of liberal
institution imposition.
Chapter 3
Imposed Liberal Institutions and
Democratic Survival
3.1 Imposed Institutions and Democratic Longevity
Decolonization in the postwar era led to the creation of many new polities. Some per-
sist to this day, while others failed only years after independence. What accounts for
the difference in survival rates? What is it about the polities which lead some states
to fail and others to persist? For a group of states, colonial experience comprise part
of the state’s democratic experience. Although colonization is associated with a list
of damaging effects, in some cases where the colonizer installed democratic or power
sharing institutions colonial legacy helped build the foundations for democratic suc-
cess. In Chapter Two, I reviewed the literature on colonial legacy, imposed polities,
and democratization and the connections between the bodies of literature. In partic-
ular, I discussed the literature on colonial legacy and democratic survival. Currently,
the relationship between colonial, built institutions and democratic survival has been
tested using the colonial power’s identity to capture the impact of colonial practices
on post-independence survival. The purpose of the chapter is to test the relation-
ship between imposed liberal institutions and the democratic longevity of the former
colonies.
British colonial legacy is the most commonly used measure to account for colonial
legacy as it has often been linked with successful democracies. A number of schol-
ars have argued, and produced supporting evidence, that British colonies are more
likely to persist in the post-colonial period. However, more investigation is needed
to understand how British colonial legacy is linked with democratic survival. The
majority of studies argue the benefits of British colonial legacy stem from the in-
stitutions created during the colonization process. These previous works have shed
light on how British colonial legacy can have a positive impact on post-independence
democracy. However, due to the use of proxy variables denoting identity of the col-
onizer, the relationship between built institutions and subsequent democracy has
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not been investigated completely. Generalizations made from the results of previ-
ous studies may lead to inaccurate conclusions and clouds our understanding of the
causal phenomenon. Colonies, even those created by the same colonizer, have differ-
ent institutional histories. Therefore, the impact of colonial legacy requires further
investigation
In this chapter, I build upon previous work of colonial legacy by testing the insti-
tutional arguments of post-independence democratic survival. Previous researchers
employed a dichotomous variable of British identity as a proxy variable of British
colonial practices to investigate the relationship between colonial legacy and the sur-
vival of democracies after independence. This study differs from other studies of
colonial legacy through the identification of built liberal institutions, and the number
of imposed liberal steps. Using country reports from the British Central Office of
Information and the U.S. Library of Congress, Bank’s Political History of the World,
historical dictionaries as well as various country histories, I gathered information on
whether institutions were created in the polity. I identify the imposed institutions,
and the expansion of liberal rights within the polity. Often colonizers expanded
power sharing institutions over time. In other words, the degree of power sharing
was often increased over time by the colonizer. I refer to this incremental expansion
of democracy as liberal steps, which I will explore in greater detail in Chapter Four.
Secondly, I expand our understanding of the effects of liberal imposed institutions.
The central research question of this chapter is: if liberal institutions were installed by
colonizers, are those democratic polities with such institutions more likely to persist
in the post-colonial period than those which did not have imposed liberal institutions.
Using duration analysis, I test the impact of imposed institutions on the survival of
democracy. The use of duration analysis allows me to analyze the effects of the insti-
tutions on democratic survival of the former colony including other variables which
influence democratic survival. There are two advantages to my approach, I do not
need to arbitrarily determine how many years to lag the variables included in the
model. Additionally, I am able to test whether British colonies with liberal, imposed
institutions are more likely to survive after independence than British colonies which
did not have liberal institutions installed. Specifically, this allows the testing of the in-
stitutional argument which explains democratic survival as an outcome of the British
creating liberal institutions in their colonies.
The outcomes of this study will lead to a deeper understanding of the relationship
between imposed institutions and post-colonial, democratic survival. In particular,
I explore how institutions built by the colonizer assisted democratic survival of the
polity after independence. By shifting the focus from British colonial legacy to insti-
tutional legacy, the results of my inquiry can be applied to states with colonial-built
power sharing institutions regardless of the identity of the colonial power. In addi-
tion to clarifying the impact of colonial legacy, this project tells us about how insti-
tutions created by other states may influence the future of democracy in the target
state. Later in Chapter Five, I apply the lessons from colonial legacy to contemporary
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imposed polities. Like colonial states modern imposed polities are unlikely to have
developed as they did without outside influence.
To reiterate, this chapter tests whether built institutions contribute to the longevity
of democracies after independence. First, I discuss the most common arguments
regarding British colonial legacy and democratic persistence. Second, I describe the
institutional impact on the democratic survival of former colonies. Third, I test my
hypotheses regarding the built institutions and the likelihood of democratic survival
using data I gathered on institutions created within 18 colonies. Fourth, I explain the
results of my models and proportional hazard tests. Having described the purposes
and scope of this chapter, I will now review the arguments most commonly used
in the colonial legacy literature concerning democratic survival and British colonial
legacy.
3.2 Argument
As stated previously, decolonization resulted in the creation of many polities, some
of which have persisted for decades, while others perished shortly after indepen-
dence. How can we explain the difference in survival rates? Why did some polities
crumble shortly after independence, while others survived and are present today in
the international system? Outlined earlier in the literature review, extant research
indicates colonial legacy plays an important role in the survival of a polity. Previous
studies demonstrate the actions of past colonizers and occupiers have lasting im-
pacts on the colony long after the colonizer has left. The majority of work on colonial
legacy examines the damage done by the colonial powers (Furtado 1965; Valenzuela
and Valenzuela 1978; Robinson 1979; Diamond 1988a, 1993; Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1995; Mamdani 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Grier 1999; Tomlinson 1999;
Abernathy 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Bernhard, Nordstrom,
and Reenock 2001; Posner 2003; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange,
Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Enterline and Greig 2008a). Although colonialism
has been linked with a variety of deleterious effects such as government instability,
dependency, and low economic growth; under some circumstances colonial legacy
has positively influenced the trajectory of democracy after independence.
Research in the colonial legacy literature points to different colonization patterns as
an explanation of why some colonies are more likely to survive than others. Specific
colonial practices produced institutions and patterns of behavior which provided
support for democracy after independence. British, and to a lesser degree, French
colonies, are associated with greater democratic persistence in the post-colonial pe-
riod. Those states were more likely, than other colonizers, to introduce democratic,
power sharing institutions in their colonies. In some cases, those institutions contin-
ued on long after independence. These arguments highlight the importance of liberal
political institutions created by the colonizer on democratic survival. However, the
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arguments have not been directly tested in the literature. Rather, researchers have
used variables to denote the identity of the colonizer to indirectly capture the cre-
ation of liberal institutions within the colonies. In other words, models testing the
phenomenon using a British and French colonial histories are used as a proxy for lib-
eral, power sharing institutions. Although we can look at trends of colonial practices,
experience varies among the colonized states. Colonies, even those administered by
the same colonial power, had different experiences.
Other studies have improved models of colonial legacy and democratic survival
through the introduction of duration of colonial rule, which allows researchers to
determine whether shorter or longer periods under colonial rule are likely to lead to
positive effects on democratic survival (Huntington 1984; Diamond 1988b; Hade-
nius 1992; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). Despite the improvements,
these studies suffer the same problem previous studies have faced: the conflation
of colonial experience with institutional experience. The colonial status, and even
length of time under colonial administration, does not capture institutional experi-
ence. Such measures serve as a proxy for institutional experience. In this project I
am interested in colonial experience in terms of the liberal institutions imposed by
the colonizer and the impact of those on the democratic persistence of the state af-
ter independence. This chapter assesses the impact the built institutions have of the
future of democratic polities.
3.2.1 Colonial Legacy
The bulk of the literature on colonial legacy focuses on the deleterious effects on the
former colony during colonial occupation and, in particular, the long-lasting effects
after independence. Colonial legacy is often associated with problems of develop-
ment, democratic rule, and conflict in the developing world (Furtado 1965; Valen-
zuela and Valenzuela 1978; Robinson 1979; Diamond 1993; Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1995; Abernathy 2000; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001) Although
the bulk of the literature addresses the negative effects, there are some aspects of
colonial legacy which are associated with long-term, positive benefits in a polity’s
post-colonial period. These benefits stem from the institutions and civic culture built
and used by the citizenry and later the independent government. Colonizers created
institutions within colonies to assist colonial administration and resource extraction.
Although, these institutions and culture were not initially created out of purely al-
truistic reasons, in many cases the imposed structures and culture which followed
supported democratic survival long after the colonizer left the state. In other words,
these built institutions have been associated with democratic survival in the post-
colonial period.
Not all colonizers installed liberal institutions in their colonies. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to identify which colonial powers created such power sharing institutions in
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their colonies. More recent research regarding colonial legacy and democratic sur-
vival focuses on the identity of the colonizer. The shift in focus occurred after a
number of researchers found British colonial legacy to be correlated with demo-
cratic success (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984; Weiner 1987; Lipset, Seong, and
Torres 1993). Such studies led other researchers to identify the colonial power in
studies of colonial legacy. According to this line of though, the identity of the colo-
nizer is an important inclusion in studies of colonial legacy as each colonial power
ruled their colonies differently. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004) assert the
nature of colonial legacy is dependent upon which state colonized the polity. Re-
call my earlier point, some colonizers merely extracted resources from their colonies
with little or no institutional construction. For example, Belgium extracted resources
from the Congo and did not foster political development nor economic development
(Conteh-Morgan 1997). On the other hand, some colonizers created a variety of
power sharing institutions (Diamond 1988b). As stated previously these institutions
were not initially created to foster democracy, but for ease of colonial administration.
In other cases, the British installed institutions in their colonies to manage gover-
nance of the colony and ameliorate tensions. Towards the end of the colonial period,
the United Kingdom anticipating the end of imperialism, installed liberal institutions
and power sharing structures. Such institutions are likely to maintain the beneficial
relationship between the former colony and the United Kingdom than less transpar-
ent polity structures. The result of these colonial practices set the stage for future
democratic success of the former colonies. The implication of this argument is that
colonial legacy varies according to the colonial power of the state. Therefore to fully
understand the impact of colonial legacy on democratic survival, researchers must
account for different colonial powers in their analysis as each had different colo-
nial practices which consequently had divergent democratic prospects. In the next
section, I discuss how colonial patterns varied by colonizer.
3.2.1.1 Colonial Practices Vary by Colonizer
Among the colonial powers, British colonies are more likely to remain democratic
after independence. In other words, British colonial status is correlated with demo-
cratic success in the post-colonial period. As noted in early research of colonial
legacy, among the most successful colonies in the post-colonial period, are those col-
onized by the British. In particular, several studies reveal evidence British colonial
legacy is associated with democratic persistence (Blondel 1972; Huntington 1984,
1991; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Weiner 1987; Barro 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000;
Clague, Gleason, and Knack 2001; Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Bernhard, Reenock,
and Nordstrom 2004). What is often cited as the main point of difference between
the British and other colonial powers is their colonization practices. The British were
more likely than other colonizers to set up power sharing institutions and used
indirect rule. Lipset asserts, the British colonial experience prepared colonies for
their transition to freedom and served as a “socialization process” which enabled
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the growth of civic culture (Lipset 1994, 5). As a result of the findings in this
literature, British colonial legacy is often included as an explanatory or control vari-
able in studies on numerous topics such as, democratization (Barro 1999; Boix and
Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006), human rights (Poe and Tate 1994), and conflict
(Djankov et al. 2007).
Contemporary research on British colonial legacy and democracy indirectly tests the
relationship either through regression models with dichotomous variables or case
studies. In addition, researchers of colonial legacy test the more general proposition
that some colonizers were better able to set their colonies up for democratic success
after independence. To test this assertion Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom employ
a duration model (2004). They identified European colonizers of colonies over the
time period 1951 - 1995. Moving beyond correlation, they use duration analysis to
directly test the relationship between colonial legacy and democratic survival. This
method allows the researchers to determine the effect of British colonial status versus
all other colonial powers on the likelihood of the democracy to survive while control-
ling for other relevant factors. Inherent in this type of model is time, the number of
years a state was a colony is included in the model to capture colonial experience. The
authors compare the colonies survival rates by colonial power. The general results of
colonial legacy are consistent with the negative picture of colonial legacy. All colonial
states, regardless of their colonizer, are more likely to fail than democratizing states
who did not have a colonial past. When the cases are separated by colonial power
they reveal different survival rates. This result indicates that identity should be con-
sidered in studies of colonial legacy. Their results support the assertion that British
colonies are better prepared for democracy in the post-colonial era. Democratic poli-
ties which were former British colonies are more likely to survive than French or
Dutch colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 241). These findings are
not limited to British colonies. When controls are included in the model to capture
development and fragmentation, French colonies democratic survival rates are only
surpassed by British colonies (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 243). This
result lends support to claims that the French colonial practices encouraged demo-
cratic survival as they used some degree of power sharing. Like British colonies,
citizens in French colonies had opportunities to participate in government. But due
to French colonial practice, French colonies did not enjoy as much liberal institu-
tional infrastructure as the British colonies. Typically, French colonies were ruled by
a French governor and authority figures of the colony were used at the lowest level
of government. This practice created more centralization of authority than the British
colonies, which may explain why French colonies did not perform as well as British
colonies.
3.2.2 Benefits of British Colonial Legacy
In this section, I examine the arguments present in the literature regarding the insti-
tutional benefits of colonial legacy. The majority of arguments regarding the posi-
§3.2 Argument 41
tive benefits of colonial legacy focus on democratic power sharing, indirect rule, the
British tutelage system, better infrastructure, elections of local bodies and legisla-
tures, and liberal institutions.
3.2.2.1 Indirect Rule and Power Sharing.
One of the most frequently used explanation of post-colonial democratic success of
former British colonies is the colonizer’s use of indirect rule. Bollen and Jackman
find indirect rule during colonization is a contributing factor to post-colonial success
of former British colonies (1985, 34). In the British colonial legacy literature, indirect
rule is referred to as power sharing by some authors. These terms are used in the
literature to refer the arrangement between the colonizer and colony where varying
degrees of authority is delegated from the Crown to local authorities to act on the
behalf of the Crown. By the 1920s indirect rule was standard British colonial policy
(Mamdani 1996). Although European colonizers did not intend to export democ-
racy to their colonies, some colonizers brought power sharing institutions from their
country (Hariri 2012). Eventually British policy did actively promote movements
towards democratization, which I will discuss in greater detail in the discussion of
the British tutelage arguments. The British, rather than creating a administration
manned by British settlers, often used local elites to run the daily business of the
colony (Emerson 1964). By using elites as their agents “rather than dismantling in-
digenous social structures, as the French did, the British left traditional patterns of
social organization in tact” (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001, 480). Although this
may seem beneficial for the colonies, in some cases this power arrangement was not
without problems. In cases where minority groups comprised the majority of those
who served as delegates or representatives, traditional cleavages and tensions were
exacerbated. Blanton, Mason, and Athow assert in many cases this was used as a
deliberate tactic to divide and conquer (2001).
Despite the potential danger of asymmetrical power relationships, indirect rule pro-
duced several benefits such as increased social base, foundation for democratic insti-
tutions, and encourages multiparty rule. The social base of the colonial polity was
increased through the introduction of power sharing (Mamdani 1996). Also, it stim-
ulated a new avenue for political participation in colonies. Such institutions enabled
diverse groups with competing interests to solve longstanding conflicts through po-
litical institutions, thereby creating the foundation needed for stable democracy (Dia-
mond 2005). In addition to colonial benefits, experience with democratic power shar-
ing laid the ground work for successful democratic institutions in the post-colonial
era. Under such institutions, the citizens had experience with power sharing insti-
tutions and are more likely to have faith that democratic institutions would work in
the post-independence period. Lastly, it is noted in the literature the use of indi-
rect rule allowed some British colonies to side step problems faced by colonies that
had little or no power sharing. Collier argues the limited use of indirect rule by
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the French explains the preponderance of one-party systems, and ultimately demo-
cratic breakdown, in former French colonies (1982). The corollary to that argument
is indirect rule encourages multiparty systems in the post-independence period. The
consensus view of authors who focus on British indirect rule and power sharing is
that the delegation of authority to the colonies created the necessary foundation for
future democratic institutions (Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Collier 1982; Bollen and
Jackman 1985; Mamdani 1996; Hyam 1999; Johnson 1999; Bernhard, Reenock, and
Nordstrom 2004; Diamond 2005).
3.2.2.2 British Tutelage System
As well as power sharing institutions, the British installed a group of institutions
from elected bodies to judicial systems as well as introducing educational institu-
tions and reforms. The reasoning behind the implementation of the institutions was
to train colonies in democratic governance and the benefits of civil society. Not only
would this support colonial administration, but also would help to support a long-
term, beneficial relationship past independence. Like many policy decisions, this
practice was not based on altruistic reasons but rested on self-interest. Under this
system, the British were able to use traditional rulers of the colonial government
(Kurz 1978). This facilitated the rule of the colony with a small number of British
colonial administrations. The installation of liberal institutions allowed the British to
create structures which they knew how to use and would minimize interference from
the elites of the colony (Owen 2002). An example of this process can be found in
the early stages of British colonization of Tanzania, “German practice was followed
where it was not repugnant to British law; but gradually new departments were
established; for example, agriculture, education and forests; and in 1920 a judicial
system was initiated and a Chief Justice appointed” (Reference Division Central Of-
fice of Information 1961b, 28). This holistic approach is often referred to as the British
tutelage model. The model is often cited as the reason for post-colonial democratic
success of former British colonies. Under the British tutelage model the colonial ad-
ministration and Governor serves as an instructor or guide through the introduction
and imposition of British-style civil institutions and society. The colonial structure
was constructed to guide the dependencies to “responsible self-government within
the Commonwealth” (Jones 1948, 4). Responsible self-government refers to the pro-
vision of a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression. In addition to civil
institutions, the British created and fostered programs which created a foundation
for the acceptance and legitimacy of the institutions such as educational reforms and
economic development programs.
Efforts to install institutions and programs to foster democratic rule increased across
all British colonies after World War II. British foreign policy statements included dec-
larations of a commitment to foster democracy in the colonies. Concurrently, British
colonial policy shifted towards preparing their dependencies for self-government.
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The central purpose of the United Kingdom in the dependencies is to
help forward their economic, social and political progress and, in so
doing, to create the conditions in which their peoples can develop self-
government on democratic foundations and, whenever possible, indepen-
dence within the Commonwealth. This task involves considerable invest-
ment, both public and private, and financial and technical assistance of
many kinds from outside, principally from the United Kingdom. In some
cases it involves the building up of new nations from modest founda-
tions(Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 1).
This policy focus encapsulates the British tutelage model in that it underscores the
creation of liberal institutions as well as conditions which enable the institutions to
grow. The timing of this shift was in response to the growing nationalist trends in
the world. Based on their previous experience in Ireland, India, and Egypt and lack
of sufficient economic resources, decision-makers decided it would be unrealistic to
actively resist national movements in their dependencies (Hyam 1999). Rather, than
allowing nationalist groups to dictate moves towards self-rule, the British govern-
ment strategically introduced reforms hoping to stay ahead of what they consid-
ered extremist groups and win the support of moderate groups within their country
(Hyam 1999). Thereby, the British established “a tradition of meeting colonial dis-
content by reforms which associated the subject peoples more closely with their own
governing” (Smith 2007, 6). In many cases, this close association contributed to faith
in the political institutions during and well after independence.
Although the policy shift was not entirely altruistic, the imposition of the British tute-
lage model resulted in positive benefits such as growth of civic culture, rule of law,
and faith in rule of law. As discussed previously, rule of law is a necessary precon-
dition for democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991). The imposition of the bureaucratic
and judicial systems, part of the British tutelage model, encouraged indigenous in-
volvement in the bureaucratic and judicial systems, which in turn bolstered faith in
the rule of law (Weiner 1987). Faith in rule of law was instrumental in the creation
of a civic culture within the colony ass it encourages greater growth in civic culture .
3.2.2.3 Election of Local Bodies and Legislatures
Rather than using the general British tutelage model, other researchers look towards
the imposition of particular institutions to explain the success of former British de-
pendencies. In particular, they cite elections of local bodies, legislatures, and judicial
bodies as the most important determinant in post-independence democratic success.
Installation of elected local bodies and legislatures was a common practice of the
colonial administration. “The British method of promoting political advance in the
[British] dependencies has been to create territorial governments which comprise a
legislature or law-making body, an executive body (which, with the Governor, is
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the executive authority) and an independent judiciary” (Reference Division Central
Office of Information 1961a, 3). Some scholars argue the election of local bodies
and legislatures during the colonial period prepared colonies for democracy in the
post-colonial period (Weiner 1965; Diamond 1988b; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993;
Abernathy 2000). The installation of elections was to assist the colonizer in the
administration of the colony as well as serving to appease discontent. Elections
were often used to quell dissatisfaction of the local population. Among the colonial
powers, the British were more likely to use reform and compromise in response to
contentious issues (Smith 1978; Hadenius 1992). In particular, expansion of indirect
rule through the construction of local governing bodies and legislatures was a type
of reform often used by the British in response to resistance (Mamdani 1996). As
an unintended consequence, the elections of local governing bodies and legislatures
prepared colonies for the transition to freedom. Such elections served as a “social-
ization process” for the polities (Lipset 1994, 5). The experience with elections prior
to independence allowed habituation of elections and peaceful transfer of power.
Additionally, such elections fostered faith in the ability of elections, and the subse-
quent elected officials, to peacefully channel disparate interests within government
structures.
3.2.2.4 Better Infrastructure
Lastly, better infrastructure is another benefit associated with British colonial legacy.
Colonists often created or enhanced existing infrastructure which allowed for more
efficient extraction of resources and governing of their colonies. For example, to reach
the interior of Kenya, the British extended the coastal railway originally built by the
Imperial British East Africa Company. After the colonists left their dependencies, the
built infrastructure was left intact. Such infrastructure supported economic growth
within the former colony, which in turn supported the states democratization. In-
frastructure is essential to encourage and support economic growth (Esfahani and
Ramirez 2003), which in turn supports further democratization. The conceptualiza-
tion of infrastructure within the literature varies by study, but often includes, educa-
tion systems, transportation, communication structures, and bureaucracies as exam-
ples of colonial-built infrastructure. The British were more likely to create better in-
frastructure in their dependencies than other colonizers created within their colonies
(Von der Mehden 1964; Moore 1966; Dahl 1971; Weiner 1987; Hadenius 1992;
Diamond 1988a; Brown 1999; Abernathy 2000). Transportation and communication
structures were created or strengthened and expanded in British colonies to ease
colonial administration and enable resource extraction. To further support colonial
administration, bureaucracies were staffed with local personnel. “Almost all the mid-
dle and lower grades of administrative services are filled by local people, and, with
assistance from the United Kingdom in education and training, increasing numbers
are being recruited into the higher grades” (Reference Division Central Office of In-
formation 1961a, 3). To ensure there were enough local candidates to recruit for
§3.2 Argument 45
bureaucratic positions, the British often introduced educational programs. In addi-
tion to support of colonial administration, infrastructure was put in place to prepare
for the independence of the colonies. “The attainment of independence by each ter-
ritory has represented the culmination of a process of development, not only of the
constitutional structure but of the country’s public services (notably educational) and
economy” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1970, 2).
The unintended consequence of the colonial-built institutions was the installation
of an infrastructure which served as a foundation for democratic survival after in-
dependence. The transportation and communication components of the infrastruc-
ture were necessary for the newly independent nation to develop economically. As
the colonies increased their levels of development, democracy was strengthened
and further democratization was encouraged. Economic development encourages
democracy through the transformation of workers’ social conditions and expansion
of the middle class (Lipset 1959). Positive economic performance, in terms of pos-
itive growth and higher levels of development, support the endurance of democ-
racies (Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Neubauer 1974; Huntington 1968; Linz and
Stepan 1978; Bollen 1979; Gasiorowski 1995; Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski
and Limongi 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998). In addition to the economic
benefits of the transportation infrastructure, the installed bureaucracies fostered the
necessary frameworks and administrative skills necessary for successful administra-
tion of democracies in the post-colonial period. As Schumpeter (1949) explains, an
effective bureaucracy is essential to democracy and economic development.
Educational programs, another component of the colonial-built infrastructure, had
lasting impacts on states’ polities and economic health. In particular, higher educa-
tion supports democracy by “enhancing its economic and social foundations” (Dia-
mond 1992, 36). Grier’s findings reveal higher levels of education are associated with
post-colonial growth(1999, 329). Education has an even wider impact on states’ social
foundations. The implementation of educational programs stimulates greater faith
in democratic values and practices (Lipset 1959). In addition to fostering growth
of values and practices, education and literacy rates are essential to the sustenance
of democratic norms (Lipset 1959). Further, education contributes to the expan-
sion of democracy. Along with higher education levels comes increased demand for
democratization as can be seen in the case of Nigeria. “The spread of Western ed-
ucation, and of political consciousness resulting from it, created a growing demand
amongst a section of the community for an increased share in political responsibil-
ity. The necessity for constitutional advance was recognized by the Governors of
the period” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1960, 29). To respond
to such demands the British installed liberal institutions. Not only does education
lead to increased pressure for more liberalization, education plays a pivotal role in
the facilitation of democratic transitions (Feng and Zak 1999). Thus, the built in-
frastructure facilitates democratic survival after independence by fostering economic
growth, enabling the growth of the middle class, fostering faith in democratic values,
and increasing demand for democratic rights.
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3.2.3 Institutions and post-colonial survival
Although the arguments regarding why British colonies were more likely to sur-
vive after independence vary by the causal mechanism they identify, the arguments
share one commonality - the creation of liberal, or power-sharing, institutions by
the colonial power. In other words, the arguments for greater survival of former
former British colonies hinges on the positive impact liberal institutions had on the
polity and its civil society. States in which the colonizer introduced liberal insti-
tutions were more successful in the post-colonial period (Lange, Mahoney, and vom
Hau 2006). The institutions facilitate a polity’s survival after the after the withdrawal
of the colonial power from the colony. Such institutions play a significant role in the
survival of polities as they channel the interests of competing groups within the gov-
ernment (Schmitter and Karl 1991). This is particularly salient for former colonies
as experience with strong political institutions are associated with the persistence of
post-colonial states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). The assertion that
institutions are instrumental to polity survival of former colonies is consistent with
work in the democratization literature which points to the important role institutions
play in the persistence of democracies.
The institutions, and subsequent civic culture, described as positive benefits of British
colonial legacy are also cited in the democratic consolidation literature as neces-
sary conditions for a polity’s democratic consolidation and survival. Not only is
the creation of institutions central to the transition to democracy (Przeworski 1991;
Geddes 1999), institutions such as elections, power sharing bodies, judiciary, bu-
reaucracy, and infrastructure are essential for democratic consolidation. A state is
considered to be a consolidated democracy when its democratic institutions are fully
formed and operational. Diamond explains, "the essence of democratic consolida-
tion is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods
by both elites and mass" (1999, 20). Similarly, Linz and Stepan consider democracy to
be consolidated when a polity’s institutions and procedures are viewed as “the rules
of the game” (2011). For a consolidated state, institutions alone are not sufficient, the
institutions and norms must viewed as legitimate by the polity’s citizenry. The insti-
tutions are viewed as legitimate because they resolve conflict, allow for the possibility
of representation, monitor collective agreements, and are able to implement the laws
passed by the legislature. First, power sharing institutions resolve conflict through
the government (Rustow 1970). Institutions which allow for for government rep-
resentation of minority groups are likely to reduce the probability of ethnic conflict
(Saideman et al. 2002). Thereby, reducing the threat that the polity will fail due to
a violent, internal conflict. Elections do not eliminate conflict in a state, but provide
for the pacific resolution of conflict (Rustow 1970; Przeworski 1986). The “peaceful
rivalry for the exercise of power exists constitutionally” (Aron 1969, 41). Institutions
allow consolidated democracies to channel and resolve conflict pacifically.
Among the most identifiable democratic institutions are free and fair elections. Al-
though free and competitive elections are often associated with minimalist defini-
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tions, consolidated democracies require more than the mere presence of such elec-
tions (Dahl 1971). For consolidated democracies, there must be legitimate competi-
tion between political organizations. Competing leaders and political organizations
provide alternative public policies to the public and participate in the selection of
those policies through elections (Schattschneider 1960). Groups are able to legally
compete for power and those who gain power through election by the people are re-
sponsible to the people of the country (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Vanhannen 1997).
All groups competing for power must obey the rules of the democratic game. Prze-
worski expounds, "democracy is a system in which parties lose elections. There are
parties: divisions of interest, values and opinions. There is competition, organized
by rules. And there are periodic winners and losers" (1991, 10). In a consolidated
democracy, parties and their supporters accept the lose of an election because they
know, due to the institutionalization of conflict, they will be able to run in future
elections and may gain seats in the future.
Rule of law is another aspect of consolidated democratization (Dahl 1971; Dia-
mond 1999). To facilitate the observance of the laws and provide as a check to
other branches of government, consolidated democracies require judicial systems.
Judicial institutions serve as monitors of collective agreements (Carrubba 2005). Ju-
dicial systems ensure laws of the polity are applied consistently across all sectors of
society (Linz and Stepan 2011). As stated previously, democratic consolidation is
not just the presence of the all the institutions of a liberal democracy, but the atti-
tudes and norms of a democracy must be upheld and habituated. The maintenance
and integrity of the rule of law is essential for both “constitutional and attitudinal
consolidation” (Walker 2006, 757). In other words, a judicial system ensures political
activity is executed as outlined by a state’s constitution and laws, but it also increases
faith in the legitimacy of the polity and the democracy.
For democracies to persist they must possess a well-trained bureaucracy (Schum-
peter 1949) and a functioning infrastructure. Concurring with Schumpeter, Suleiman
asserts “no democracy can be truly anchored or consolidated unless the state has a
reliable, competent bureaucratic organization at its disposal” (1999, 141-142). Mod-
ern democracies require a “usable state bureaucracy” (Linz and Stepan 2011, 11).
Although legislatures enact laws, bureaucrats implement those laws. As such an
effective bureaucracy must have the capacity to realize objectives (Rustow 1970).
Through bureaucracy a polity is able to execute its duties in “an orderly, predictable,
and legal manner” (Suleiman 1999, 143). A successful, impartial functioning of the
bureaucracy signals to the citizenry that that the ways laws are enacted are systematic
and not capricious and tied to the party or parties which hold power in the polity. In
a similar role, infrastructure provides the polity capacity to realize objectives (Rus-
tow 1970). The infrastructure also supports economic development which is critical
for democratic survival (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 1996). The arguments pre-
sented in the previous paragraphs indicate institutions built by the colonizer are the
key to post-democratic survival rather than the identity of the colonizer.
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To asses whether liberal, imposed institutions contribute to the democratic survival
and how that compares with previous studies, I test competing arguments regarding
colonial legacy. First, I start with the aforementioned assertion that British colonial
legacy has a positive impact on the persistence of democracies. Democracies that
were once British colonies are more likely to persist after independence due to the
colonial practice of indirect rule and creation of liberal, political institutions.
Hypothesis 1: Democracies which were former British colonies are
more likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial lega-
cies.
As outlined in the previous discussion, institutions and civic culture are indispens-
able to the construction, growth, and survival of democracy. However, in the current
literature, the impact of post-colonial legacy is investigated through the use of iden-
tity of the colonizer as a proxy in tests to determine impact of colonial experience
and the likely future of democracy in the former colony. Identity of the colonizer
is used as colonial powers used different colonization practices. As stated earlier,
the rationale for the use of identity is colonial powers such as the United Kingdom,
and to a lesser extend France, were more likely to create power sharing institutions
within their colonies. Due to the British propensity to install liberal institutions in
their colonies, researchers often use a dichotomous variable denoting British colonial
legacy as a proxy variable for democratic experience in studies which test a wide vari-
ety of dependent phenomena. Although such studies have advanced understanding
of colonial legacy, the picture is incomplete as the amount of institutions and timing
of those institutions has not been examined.
Institutions are key to post-colonial democratic survival, not the identity of the col-
onizer. The positive benefits of colonialism were proceeded by colonial-built institu-
tions, not dependent on which state administered the colony. Identity of the colonial
power alone is insufficient as colonizers did not employ uniform colonial patterns.
Although we can speak about general patterns of colonization, colonizers did not
engage in uniform behavior in the administration of its colonies. The British model
of colonization was not systematically installed in all the Crown’s dependencies. In
some cases the British created very few institutions such as Malaysia and Uganda.
While in other cases such as India and Jamaica, a large amount of liberal institutions
were installed. Nor is the imposition of liberal institutions in colonies limited to
British colonization. Like the British, other colonial powers imposed institutions to
facilitate colonial administration. For example, Chad experienced imposition under
French rule and as did the Philippines under American colonization.
As a result of focusing on whether a colony was held by the United Kingdom, the
arguments regarding built institutions influence on democratic longevity have not
been tested in the current literature. As pointed out earlier, it is the existence of the
institutions, not the identity of the imposer, which produces the positive benefits for
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democratic survival. Thus, it is necessary to test whether liberal institutions have an
impact on whether democracy survives after independence. Although this has not
been done before, the creation of institutions is a discrete phenomenon which can be
identified, measured, and analyzed.
Although the crux of arguments regarding British colonial legacy lie in the positive
impact power-sharing institutions had on democracy after colonization, measures to
capture institutions are not used in the testing of democratic survival. This is due
to, in part, the lack of data available to test those arguments. Rather, dichotomous
variables are often used to capture the positive effects of the institutions installed
by colonizers. The majority of studies use British colonial status as a variable to
capture experience with democratic institutions. One implication of using a British
dichotomous variable in tests of colonial legacy and democratic persistence is that it
shifts focus from institutions to whether the state was a British colony. More recently,
to account for other colonizers, the identity of the colonizer is included in empiri-
cal models of colonial legacy. The indirect measure is not sufficient to capture the
amount of institutional experience, in terms of time and amount of democratization,
or liberalization of the state. Other studies include a measure capturing the amount
of time the state was a colony. This measure, although an improvement, does not
capture institutional experience accurately. The amount of time a state was a colony
may not produce an accurate picture of institutional experience. Although colonizers
did have patterns of colonization, they did not use the same approach with all their
dependencies. Institutions, even those created by the same colonizer, varied in both
timing and number of institutions. In some cases colonizers introduced institutions
early in the colonial relationship, while in others institutions were created shortly be-
fore independence. While in others, the colonizer created very few, or no institutions
within the colony. Although we can describe colonial patterns of different colonizers
in general terms, in practice colonization varied across each colony. Even the British,
which are held as an exemplary institution builder, did not install institutions uni-
formly across its dependencies. “The British Model” is more of a tendency than a
rule. “Because circumstances vary widely between territories, there is no set proce-
dure for political development. Where circumstances are similar, however, a certain
pattern is discernible” (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 3).
Thus, it is necessary to examine the process of liberalization in the colony to under-
stand the subsequent impact on the democratic polity.
In addition to more accurately model the phenomenon, directly testing the institu-
tional argument may provide an answer for conflicting results in the literature. Pre-
vious studies have revealed contradictory evidence for the effect of British colonial
legacy. Hadenius’s (1992) initial analysis of the relationship reveals a positive corre-
lation between British colonial legacy and level of democracy. However, when vari-
ables to capture level of development and percentage of Protestant population were
were included in the model, the relationship between democratization and British
colonial legacy disappeared. Those results led Hadenius to conclude that the rela-
tionship between British colonial legacy and democratization is spurious, indicating
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that other factors drive democratization. Hadenius’s disparate findings may be due
to the assumption that all British colonies have a uniform institutional experience.
This may have also led to Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom’s (2004) surprising
finding that Spanish colonies out perform British colonies in terms of post-colonial
democratic survival. Although we can talk about the British model colonization, the
colonial experience of British colonies varied. Patterns of colonization varied by num-
ber of institutions created within the colony, as well, as the timing of establishment
of the institutions. This underscores the importance of directly testing the institu-
tional argument. If colonizers do not create political institutions in the colonies, so
the argument goes, the benefits of colonial legacy will not follow, regardless of the
identity of the colonizer. These arguments hinge on political institutions and the
benefits they provide, not the British identity of the colonizer. In other words, the
positive benefits of British colonial experience can be attributed to imposed institu-
tions installed by the colonizer rather than their colonial power. Therefore, it is the
institutions and colonial practices of the British which explain why British colonial
legacy is associated with greater survival. Liberal institutions created by the colonial
power have lasting impacts on colonies. Many institutions created by colonizers and
occupiers endure well past independence. The institutions created the grounding
and structures which facilitate greater democratic persistence. Therefore, I posit:
Hypothesis 2: Former colonies with liberal, imposed institutions are
more likely to persist after independence than democracies which did not
have liberal, imposed institutions.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Democratic Survival Models
3.3.1.1 British Colonial Legacy Democratic Survival Model
Duration of Democratic Episode = α + β1British Colonial Legacy + β2Economic Per-
formance + β3Level of Development - β4Religious Fractionalization - β5Ethnic Frac-
tionalization
3.3.1.2 Imposed Liberal Institutions Democratic Survival Model
Duration of Democratic Episode = α + β1Imposed Liberal Institutions + β2Economic




To test my hypotheses, I construct a data set of democracies that began their demo-
cratic episode over the time period 1946 - 1969. In the construction of my dataset, I
use Enterline and Greig’s imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previously
discussed in the literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed insti-
tutions which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Next using Bernhard,
Reenock and Nordstrom’s (2004) Colonial Legacy Data Set, I identify democratic
episodes which began between 1946 and 1969. They define a democratic episode as a
period of democracy in a state’s history. An episode ends when the democracy fails.
A democratic episode contains multiple observations which capture each year of a
state’s democratic episode. The episodes included their data set include episodes
for former colonies which include those with liberal, imposed institutions and those
without such institutions, as well as states that did not experience colonization and
whose democratic growth is mainly attributed to internal factors. The last year for
both datasets is 1995. Using their operationalizations, I extend the datasets to 2010.
My dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period. The countries in-
cluded in the dataset are listed in Figure 3.11. I exclude Germany and Japan from
my data set as they are unique cases. Additionally, they are often held up as the
prototypical example of democratic imposition. As they are the direct result of the
outcome of WWII, a broad coalition of states, unprecedented economic programs to
support the development of the nascent democracies. The inclusion of these excep-
tional cases would skew my results and lead to ungeneralizable results. In Bernhard,
Reenock, and Nordstrom’s dataset, India’s democratic episode is divided in to two
periods: before and after the 1975 Emergency. In their dataset India’s democratic ex-
perience is denoted by two democratic episodes. The first, democratic episode spans
the time period from independence until the 1975 Emergency. The second episode
picks up after the government returns to democratic practices in 1977 to the present.
In Enterline and Greig’s dataset (2008a), the Indian Polity is coded as a democratic
polity from independence to 1994 which is the end of their dataset. As my research
question focuses on imposed institutions, I use the continuous coding of the Indian
polity. The Emergency temporarily interrupted the provision of democracy, however,
the institutions remained in place and persisted throughout the turmoil.
The dataset consists of democratic episodes which end during the time period of
covered by the data set and those that endure past 2010. In this dataset democratic
polities do not re-enter the dataset as the imposed institutions ceased to exist at the
first democratic polity failure. For subsequent periods of democracy, it is unlikely
1There are two sets of countries included in the dataset. The first are former colonies with lib-
eral, imposed institutions. The second serves as a comparison set of states experiencing a democratic
episode. Those states do not have liberal, imposed institutions. Some of the states included in the
second set are former colonies. Former Spanish colonies include: Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The Dutch held Indonesia as a colony. Madagascar was a
French colony. South Korea was under control of Japan. The United Kingdom colonized Myanmar and
Trinidad. Somalia was under joint rule of the British and Italians.
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Figure 3.1: Countries Included in Dataset
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the imposed polities would be revived. The previous institutions may serve as a
model for subsequent democratic or power sharing institutions but they would not
be imposed by the former colonial power. Not all polities failed within the time frame
of the data set. Some such as Botswana, India, Jamaica, and Mauritius persist past
the 2010, the last year in the dataset. Polities without a failure are right-censored.
This occurs when the data set ends and the event of interest has not happened. In
this case, the event of interest is failure of the democratic polity. In other words
the polity does not fail. Although the information is incomplete, this does not pose
a problem as right-censored cases still give us information on how long the polity
has persisted. As the end date of the polity is not included in the dataset, only the
duration until the end of dataset is included in the analysis. Right-censored cases
result in more conservative estimates because the complete length of duration is
not included in the estimation of the hazard ratios. Figure 3.2 contains a graphical
representation of the uncensored and right-censored cases as well as the time period
over which data is gathered. A democratic episode has yearly observations for each
polity while it remains democratic. Thus, the unit of analysis is the country-year.
The dependent, independent and control variables are gathered over the time period
of 1945 - 2010 which is labeled as the observation period in Figure 3.2. Therefore, all
colonial legacy variables are fixed and those gathered after independence are time
varying. I start with this model as it is similar to those employed in the contemporary
colonial legacy literature and allows for better comparison of my results and previous
findings regarding colonial legacy.
To test my hypotheses I employ an event history model, also known as duration
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analysis. The results indicate the impact each variable has on the probability the
polity will survive. This model allows me to estimate the effect each variable has on
the hazard rate. This rate is is the frequency at which the dependent phenomenon
fails. In this study, failure occurs when a polity collapses. Like regression analysis,
this approach allows for the analysis of how covariates affect the dependent variable.
I use an event history model rather than a regression model because the event history
model allows for the direct inclusion of time in the model. In regression analysis
researchers often use techniques such as splines to account or correct for the effect of
time in the model. Rather than using such techniques, time is built into this approach
and is an essential part of the model (Mills 2011). Time can be measured in different
metrics such as hours, days, months and years, as is the case in this study. As I do not
have any a priori expectations regarding duration dependence, I assume the effects
are the variables are linear. The use of this assumption allows for direct comparison
with those models employed by Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004).
3.3.3 Dependent Variable: Length of Democratic Episode
Using duration analysis, I follow polities over time and observe at which time they
experience a polity failure. Unlike regression analysis which focuses on the de-
pendent phenomenon, duration analysis not only focuses on the dependent phe-
nomenon as well as the time to an event (Mills 2011). This enables us to compare
survival between two or more groups and to assess the relationship between explana-
tory variables and survival time. For this model, the dependent variable is failure
of the democratic polity and the length of a state’s democratic episode taken from
Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom’s Colonial Legacy Dataset (2004). A democratic
polity fails when the the polity transitions to a non-democratic polity. As explained
earlier, a democratic episode is a period of democracy in a polity’s history. The size
of the democratic episode is measured as the number of years in a state’s democratic
episode. A polity’s democracy is considered to be lasting or persist as the demo-
cratic episode continues. A state enters a democratic episode when the state achieves
a minimum level of democracy. A democratic episode ends when the democracy
fails. In other words when the state transitions to another regime type or experiences
an interruption or interregnum period. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom (2004)
gathered their cases from Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1995), the Political Regime
Change Dataset (Gasiorowski 1996), Freedom in the World, the Political Handbook
of the World, and Classifying Political Regimes (Przeworski et al. 1996).
3.3.4 Independent Variables: British Colonial Legacy and Imposed Lib-
eral Institutions
To accurately assess the impact of imposed institutions on democratic survival, I
include variables to capture the presence of liberal, imposed institutions installed
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by the colonial power. Institutions include, a legislative body, a judiciary, and an
electoral system under which citizens directly elect a representative. In this chapter,
I use two measures of liberal, imposed institutions. The first variable is of is of
institutional experience is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if there were imposed
liberal institutions in the polity and zero if no liberal institutions were installed by
the colonial power. The second variable is an ordinal measure of the liberal steps
created within the colony.
Ideally, I would like to include variables to capture British colonial history and im-
posed liberal institutions in the same model to test which has the greater impact
on democratic longevity. However due to multicollinearity, I am unable to include
both variables in the same model. The dichotomous variables which capture British
colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions have a correlation of 0.719. This high
correlation is due to the high number of British colonies in my sample and the British
tendency of installing liberal institutions in their colonies to aid with administration
and foster the beneficial relationship after independence.
For the majority of imposed institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions
in one decree, act of law or instance. Rather the liberalization of colonies was pro-
gressive. “The constitutions are altered stage by stage to give local people a more
representative and a more responsible share in the government in their country”
(Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961a, 3). The process can be seen
as an incremental one in which each expansion of liberal rights can be seen as a step
towards democracy. “British colonial policy after 1945 prescribed the steady intro-
duction of phase after phase of constitutional development, carefully graduated to
the individual needs of each colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceler-
ation became possible and desirable” (Darwin 2007, 89). This is consistent with the
view of democracy as a process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry
Diamond explains, “democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon”
(1999, 18).
To reflect this incremental process, instead of coding discrete cases of institutional
building or establishment, I code those incremental steps of liberalization which I
defined in Chapter 1 as Liberal Steps. For example, I code the creation of a Legislative
council with some elected representation as one step. If the council is expanded
to allow more popularly elected representation, I code that as another step. If the
council is transformed into a popularly elected legislature, that is coded as another
step. This is consistent with work in democratization where democracy falls on a
continuum and states may progress towards democratic consolidation.
As all colonial legacy variables are fixed in my models, I created a dichotomous
variable to distinguish between those polities with 5 or fewer imposed, liberal steps
and those with 6 or more liberal steps.This division was chosen to separate those
cases with a small amount of liberal institutions and those with a larger number.
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3.3.5 Control Variables
To accurately assess the impact of imposed political institutions and other factors of
interest, I control for other factors influencing polity duration. Level of development,
economic performance, presidential system, religious fractionalization, and ethnic
fractionalization have significant impact on the persistence of polities.
Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater democratic per-
sistence (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To capture a state’s level of economic
development, I use GDP per capita in constant 1990 International Dollars. To facili-
tate analysis, I scaled the unit of measurement from one international dollar to 1,000
international dollars. The information was gathered from the 2013 Maddison Project
Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013).
Conversely, economic contraction is associated with the failure of democratic polities.
Poor economic performance is potentially damaging to the persistence of democratic
polities (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Remmer 1991). Economic Performance is
measured as the proportion of yearly change in GDP per capita. I used data from the
2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013) to calculate the proportion
of yearly change.
In addition to control for economic factors, I control for social fragmentation by in-
cluding measures that capture ethnic and religious fractionalization. Ethnic and re-
ligious cleavages complicate the chance of survival for democracies. Such divisions
create additional challenges to nascent political institutions, as they are more likely
to have home interests than the fledgling political institutions are able to channel. I
use Selway’s ethnic and religious fractionalization measures from his Cross-cutting
Cleavages Dataset (2011). Data for his indices were compiled from The World Val-
ues Survey, European Values Survey, The Eurobarometer, the Afrobarometer, Arab
Barometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project, The Asian Barometer, the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and a survey performed by the World
Health Organization (Selway 2011, 55). Selway defines fractionalization as “the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a society belong to the same
group” Selway (2016). Although these measures are included in the Cross-cutting
Cleavages dataset, the variables are single-dimensional. That is, the measures cap-
ture the degree to which the states are ethnically or religiously fractured. Both mea-
sures range from zero to one where zero indicates no fractionalization and the larger
the score, the more fractionalization present. Selway’s measures of fractionalization
are highly correlated with Reynal-Querol’s (2002) and Fearon’s (2003) ethnic and cul-
tural fractionalization indices, as well as Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat
and Wacziarg’s (2003) ethnic linguistic and religious fractionalization dataset. I use




The duration analysis was conducted on 34 polities. The mean duration of democracy
is 21.3 years and the median democratic episode in the data set is 11 years. Over the
time period covered by the dataset, 1945 - 2010, 25 of 34 polities failed. Nine polities
persisted past 2010 which means they are right-censored in the dataset.
For each model, I estimate models with a Weibull form as this is the distribution cho-
sen by Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom. They assert the form is appropriate as
“there may be a consolidation effect that encourages democratic survival as democ-
racy ages” (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 236). I use this model so I
may directly compare my results with those of Bernhard Reenock and Nordstrom
(2004). The Weibull distribution assumes the hazard rates vary monotonically across
time. In other words, the proportional hazards do not vary across time in the model.
Column one in my results tables include the Weibull results.
Additionally, I use a Cox model so I may test for violations of the proportional haz-
ard assumption. Results of the Cox Model are reported in column two of the results
table. Both Weibull and Cox models assume hazards are proportional over time.
In other words, parameters remain stable over time (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and
Zorn 2003). If a covariate or several covariates violate the proportional hazard as-
sumptions errors in estimation can occur. For example if a model has a hazard ratio
that decreases over time, using a distribution which assumes proportional hazards,
the relative risk is underestimated. Also, the standard errors will be incorrect which
leads to decreased power of significance test (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002).
Nonproportionality may be introduced through memory effects of covariates, which
will lead to a violation of the proportional hazards assumption (Box-Steffensmeier,
Reiter, and Zorn 2003). If nonproportionality is found in the model, it may be cor-
rected by introducing an interaction variable of the coefficient violating the assump-
tion multiplied by time (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). After estimating
the Cox model, I test for violations of the proportional hazard assumption through
a correlation of time with the scaled Schoenfeld residuals of the Cox model results.
These scaled residuals can only be calculated using a Cox model. The first step to
determining whether the proportional hazards assumption isn’t violated is to look at
the global test. If the global test’s rho is significant, it indicates there may be a viola-
tion of the proportional hazards assumption. Next, an examination of covariate tests
will identify if any of the covariates violate the assumption. If the rho is significant
it “indicates that the residuals are trending over time and suggests nonproportional
influence of that covariate” (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003, 36). To ac-
count for the fluctuations of hazards over time, the covariate may be multiplied by
time and included in the model with all the covariates. When the interactive term or
terms are included in the model it is referred to as a Cox Nonproportional Hazard.
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3.4 Discussion of Results of Duration Models
The results of my analysis of hypotheses are presented in Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.9.
Table 3.2 reports the analysis for hypothesis one regarding British colonial heritage.
As posited in the colonial legacy literature, democracies which were former British
colonies are more likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial
legacy. For states with democratic episodes beginning between 1946 and 1969, British
colonies are more likely to persist than states without British colonial heritage. The
positive impact of British colonial legacy is consistent across all three models. The
Weibull model indicates that states with British colonial legacy have 25.7 percent
of the hazard of polities without British colonial heritage. British colonial heritage
decreases the odds of democracy failing by 74.3 percent. The Weibull model indicates
level of economic development has a positive impact on the persistence of democracy.
Consistent with hypotheses regarding the dangers of ethnic fractionalization, the
model indicates polities with higher levels of fractionalization are more likely to
suffer a democratic failure.
To test for violations of the proportional hazards assumption, I use scaled Schoen-
feld residuals of the Cox model, I tested the model and variables for any violations
of nonproportionality. The results of the test for proportional hazards assumption is
reported in Table 3.3. The significance of the global test indicates that the assump-
tion of nonproportionality is violated in the model. To determine which variable or
variables are violating the assumption, I look to see if the rhos of any of the variables
in the model are to blame. The level of economic development variable violations
the assumption; the hazards for the coefficient vary across time. To account for
nonproportional hazards, I include level of development multiplied by time in the
model. The inclusion of this interaction variable changes the type of model from a
Cox model to a Cox Nonproportional Hazards Model, also known as the Cox NPH
model. After accounting for nonproportionality, I have similar results to that of the
Weibull model. Democracies with British colonial legacy are more likely to persist
than democracies without British colonial heritage. British colonies are 72.9 percent
more likely to survive than other colonies or democratizing states. Level of economic
development contributes to democratic survival, however, the benefits of economic
development are slightly lower in Cox NPH model. Ethnic Fractionalization is sig-
nificant in the Weibull and Cox models. After accounting for nonproportionality,
the variable is no longer significant as reported in the Cox NPH model. These re-
sults support hypothesis 1, democracies which were former British colonies are more
likely to persist than democracies with different or no colonial legacies. These results
are consistent with previous research on the positive impact of British colonial legacy
on democratic survival after independence.
As argued previously, arguments regarding British colonial legacy rest on the in-
stitutions and power sharing structures installed by the British during colonization.
Thus, it is the built institutions which produce the benefits rather than the identity
§3.4 Discussion of Results of Duration Models 59
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
British Colonial Heritage 0.525 0.500 0 1
Imposed Liberal Institutions 0.465 0.499 0 1
Economic Performance 0.024 0.045 -0.149 0.279
Level of Economic Development 5312.657 4833.739 419.358 21314.380
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.438 0.200 0.002 0.930
Religious Fractionalization 0.412 0.213 0.003 0.799
Per Polity
697 total observations for 34 polities 20.5 1 60
First Enry Time = 0
Exit Time 21.265 1 63
723 total analysis time at risk 21.265 1 63
25 Failures 0.735 0 1
Table 3.2: British Colonial Legacy and Democratic Survival (All Democratizing
States)
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model Cox NPH Model
British Colonial Heritage 0.257*** 0.312*** 0.271***
(0.113) (0.135) (0.125)
Economic Performance 0.039 0.133 0.254
(0.192) (0.677) (1.348)
Level of Economic Development 0.668*** 0.698*** 0.409***
(0.101) (0.090) (0.114)
Ethnic Fractionalization 17.749** 9.870* 5.286
(25.198) (13.598) (7.664)
Religious Fractionalization 2.700 2.108 2.449
(2.847) (2.0439) (2.571)




Log Likelihood -41.107 -63.733 -62.223
Chi Square 34.30 26.22 23.21
Probability > Chi Square 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 1.331
(0.212)
NOTE: N = 6912. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
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Table 3.3: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption for British Colonial Legacy
Model
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
British Colonial Heritage -0.043 0.05 0.826
Economic Performance -0.157 1.32 0.250
Level of Economic Development 0.477 9.34 0.002
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.179 1.63 0.202
Religious Fractionalization -0.212 2.93 0.087
Global Test — 10.76 0.056
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
Table 3.4: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (All Democratizing
States)
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model Cox NPH Model
Imposed Liberal Institutions 0.391** 0.427* 0.400*
(0.174) (0.214) (0.202)
Economic Performance 0.260 0.054 0.070
(0.101) (0.250) (0.323)
Level of Economic Development 0.671*** 0.700** 0.479***
(0.106) (0.104) (6.917)
Ethnic Fractionalization 13.474* 7.489 4.720
(19.801) (10.313) (6.917)
Religious Fractionalization 4.754 3.52 4.484
(5.136) (3.761) (5.057)




Log Likelihood -43.827 -65.633 -64.397
Chi Square 28.86 21.84 24.12
Probability > Chi Square 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 1.238
(0.808)
NOTE: N = 691. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
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Table 3.5: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption for Imposed Liberal Institutions
Model
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Imposed Liberal Institutions 0.053 0.12 0.732
Economic Performance -0.109 0.62 0.431
Level of Economic Development 0.370 6.3 0.012
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.131 1.20 0.273
Religious Fractionalization -0.248 3.33 0.068
Global Test — 9.68 0.085
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
Table 3.6: Model Comparison Statistics
Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC)
British Colonial Legacy Imposed Institutions
Weibull Model 96.214 101.655
Cox Model 137.466 141.266
Cox NPH Model 136.466 140.793
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)
British Colonial Legacy Imposed Institutions
Weibull Model 127.814 133.422
Cox Model 160.157 163.957
Cox NPH Model 163.674 168.022
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Table 3.7: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (Former British
Colonies)
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Imposed Liberal Institutions 0.0341*** 0.151*
(0.045) (0.164)
Economic Performance 0.047 0.789
(0.295) (2.287)
Level of Economic Development 0.242*** 0.339**
(0.0.125) (0.109)
Ethnic Fractionalization 7938.061*** 1784.356**
(0.218) (5709.097)




Log Likelihood -10.818 -16.198
Chi Square 31.58 17.37
Probability > Chi Square 0.00 0.00
Rho 3.052
(0.849)
NOTE: N = 366. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table 3.8: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption Former British Colonies
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Imposed Liberal Institutions -0.0298 1.34 0.247
Economic Performance 0.0596 0.01 0.9299
Level of Economic Development -0.307 0.89 0.3455
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.314 1.56 0.212
Religious Fractionalization 0.263 1.14 0.286
Global Test — 2.39 0.286
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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Table 3.9: Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival (American and
French Colonies and Democratizing States)
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model Cox NPH Model
More Than Six Liberal Steps 0.553 0.430 0.103**
(0.667) (0.452) (0.111)
Economic Performance 0.000 0.015 0.060
(0.000) (0.116) (0.558)
Level of Economic Development 0.619** 0.584* 0.141***
(0.138) (0.196) (0.091)
Ethnic Fractionalization 5.543 3.273 0.294
(8.722) (8.304) (0.559)
Religious Fractionalization 0.764 0.756 0.591
(1.548) (1.500) (0.942)




Log Likelihood -21.560 -26.160 -23.916
Chi Square 19.49 12.68 18.86
Probability > Chi Square 0.00 0.03 0.00
Rho 1.419
(0.319)
NOTE: N = 331. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
64 Imposed Liberal Institutions and Democratic Survival
Table 3.10: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption (American and French Colonies
and Democratizing States)
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
More Than Six Liberal Steps 0.673 24.42 0.000
Economic Performance -0.313 2.36 0.125
Level of Economic Development 0.715 33.32 0.000
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.506 26.15 0.000
Religious Fractionalization -0.370 15.96 0.000
Global Test — 42.07 0.000
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
of the colonial power. In my second hypothesis, I posit: former colonies with liberal,
imposed institutions are more likely to persist after independence than democracies
which did not have liberal, imposed institutions. The results of my test of this hy-
pothesis are reported in Table 3.4. Imposed liberal institutions have a positive impact
on the survival of democracy. The presence of imposed liberal institutions increases
the odds of democratic polities surviving by 60.9 percent. As I did with the previous
model, I employed a Cox model and use the residuals to test for proportional haz-
ards violations. The significance of the global test for violations of the assumptions
indicates there is nonproportionality in the model. Like the model of British colonial
legacy, level of economic development violated the proportional hazards assumption.
The results of the Cox NPH model are consistent with the Weibull model. States with
imposed liberal institutions are 60 percent less likely to fail than other democratizing
states. Level of economic development has a significant impact on democratic sur-
vival in the Cox NPH model. The results reported in Table 3.4 lend support to the
hypothesis that liberal, imposed institutions contribute to the survival of democracy.
The results reported thus far indicate that British colonial legacy and imposed liberal
institutions have a positive impact on the survival of democratic polities I suspect
this may be the case as polities persisting the longest since independence are former
British colonies. Although I am unable to include variables which capture British
colonial status and presence of imposed liberal institutions in the same model, I
am able to compare the results of the models reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.4. There
are two information criterion which may be used to compare survival models. The
Akaike’s Information Criteria and Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria. Unlike
other model testing procedures, such as the likelihood-ratio and Wald tests, the mod-
els are not required to be nested to use the tests to compare the information criteria
(StataCorp 2015). Akaike’s Information Criteria or AIC is an index used to choose
between competing intervals first introduced in 1973 (Akaike 1973). “The index
takes into account both the statistical goodness of fit and the number of parame-
ters that have to be estimated to achieve this particular degree of fit, by imposing a
penalty for increasing the number of parameters. Lower values of the index indicate
the preferred model, that is, the one with the fewest parameters that still provides an
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adequate fit to the data” (Everitt 2012, 8). Like the AIC, Schwarz’s Bayesian Informa-
tion Criteria or BIC assesses the statistical goodness of fit of a model and privileges
parsimonious models to those which are over-fitted. Again, like the AIC lower values
are associated with a better fitting model. “If n = 8 this criterion will tend to favour
models with fewer parameters than those chosen by Akaike’s information criterion”
(Everitt 2012, 337). Thus, I report both AIC and BIC criterion for all models of British
colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions.
The AIC and BIC results are reported in Table 3.6. After estimation of each model,
I calculated the AIC and BIC criterion using the residuals of duration analysis. As
both models violate the proportional hazards assumption, I report the AIC and BIC
criterion for the Cox NPH Model. The AIC for the British Colonial Legacy Model is
136.466 while the AIC statistic for the Imposed Liberal Institution Model is 140.793.
The AIC statistic for the British Colonial Legacy Model is lower than that of the
Imposed Liberal Institution. However, the difference between the two criterion is
small, 4.327. The BIC criterion indicated the British Colonial Legacy model was the
better fitting model as well. The British Colonial Legacy Model BIC is 163.74 and
the Imposed Liberal Institutions Model is 168.022. The difference between the BIC
criterion is 4.348 which again is a small difference. As can be seen in Table 3.6, the
results for the Weibull and Cox Models yield similar differences
It is important to note, the AIC and BIC statistics only tell us which model provides
a better fit of the data. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones caution relying on statistics such
as AIC or BIC alone to make choices regarding model construction. The choice of
models should be based on theoretical reasoning (2004). Liberal institutions are at
the heart of arguments regarding the positive benefits of British colonization. The re-
sults of the Imposed Liberal Institutions Model lend support to those arguments. The
model indicates, imposed liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democratic
polities. As those institutions are observable and quantifiable, when the theoretical
argument rests on the benefits of those institutions variables capturing the institu-
tions rather than the identity of the colonizer should be used.
If it is the liberal institutions rather than the “Britishness” of the colony, those with
liberal institutions created by the British should persist longer than those British
colonies without liberal imposed institutions. As mentioned earlier, not all British
colonies shared the same colonial experience. The British did not impose liberal in-
stitutions in all of their colonies. Additionally, those where they did impose such
institutions, the depth of those institutions in number and complexity varied. Thus,
it is important to test the impact of liberal imposed institutions on the survival of
democracy after British colonization. To assess the impact of imposed liberal institu-
tions on the survival of British colonies, I created a subset of cases which were former
British colonies. Then using the subset, I tested the institutional hypothesis using a
Weibull and Cox models. Table 3.7 contains the results of the analysis. The results
reported support the argument that the institutions created within British colonies
play a large role in the survival of the democratic polity after independence. The
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Weibull model indicates former British colonial polities with imposed liberal insti-
tutions are more likely to survive than those without such institutions. The odds of
survival for polities with British-imposed liberal institutions are 96.6 percent higher
than those without British-imposed liberal institutions. The Cox model produces
similar, but slightly lower odds. Among polities with British colonial legacy, those
with liberal imposed institutions are 84.9 percent more likely to persist than poli-
ties without such institutions. Again level of economic development has a positive
impact on the survival of former British colonies. For polities with British colonial
heritage, fractionalization is detrimental to survival. The test of proportional haz-
ards, reported in Table 3.8, do not indicate any violation of the proportional hazard
assumption either on the global or variable level. Therefore as there was no violation
of the proportionality assumption, I did not use a NPH model. The results of my
analysis of British colonies in my sample lend support to proposition that it is the
institutions created by the British that are responsible for democratic longevity in the
post-colonial period. It is important to note these results are from a subset of former
British colonies which gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Further testing
of all former British colonies is needed for a definitive description of the relation-
ship between imposed liberal institutions and democratic longevity in former British
colonies.
Next to investigate whether imposed liberal institutions have a similar effect on
non-British colonies, I divided my sample into another subset which omitted for-
mer British colonies. The subset in this analysis includes colonies controlled by the
United States and France and states which began democratic episodes between 1946
and 1969. In this subset, there are 3 French colonies and 1 American colony. The
results of the Weibull and Cox, reported in Table 3.9, models did not indicate a sig-
nificant relationship between liberal imposed institutions and democratic survival.
The presence of imposed liberal institutions does not have an affect on the demo-
cratic survival of American or French colonies. These results may be due to the
small number of colonies with imposed, liberal institutions included in the dataset.
Or these results may be a reflection of French practice of direct rule rather than the
creation of power-sharing institutions.Thirdly, the analysis here tests whether the
presence of liberal, imposed institutions has an effect on democratic survival but
does not account for experience with the liberal institutions.
Second, I test whether a certain number of imposed liberal steps influenced the likeli-
hood of survival. In Particular, tested whether having more than six liberal steps had
a positive affect on the survival of democratic polities. I chose the number of six as
my threshold as the mode of imposed liberal steps among my 18 former colonies is 7.
Again, the Weibull and Cox models do not indicate there is any significant relation-
ship between imposed liberal steps and the longevity of democracy However, the test
for nonproportionality indicates the assumption is violated within this model as re-
ported in Table 3.10. The global test as well as the hazards of several variables do not
vary proportionally. Initially, I include time interaction variables for more than six
liberal steps, level of economic development, ethnic fractionalization, and religious
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fractionalization. Included the time interaction variable as a first step to capture
the relationship between the number of liberal steps and interaction with the liberal
institutions captured by the steps. Due to the low number of former colonies and
democratizing states within this subset, the inclusion of all the interaction variables
washed the model out. Therefore, I drop all the time interaction variables except for
level of economic development as it was significant in the Weibull model and a sig-
nificant contributor to democratic survival in previous models within this chapter. In
the Cox NPH model, 7 or more liberal steps are associated with a 90.7 percent chance
of democratic survival. My results indicate the imposition of only a few steps is not
sufficient for the positive impact on democratic persistence in American and French
colonies. Installing a few liberal measures does not lead to a higher likelihood of the
survival of the democratic polity but there must be enough liberal steps created to
demonstrate the usefulness and legitimacy of the institutions. It is important to note
the results regarding imposed liberal institutions in these former colonies only serves
as a first exploration. In the next chapter, I look at how repeated interaction with the
liberal, imposed institutions affect survival of the democratic polity.
3.5 Conclusions and Implications
Prior studies have noted the importance of British colonial legacy. In this chapter, I
expand our understanding of the relationship by testing whether institutions created
by colonial powers contribute to post-independence survival of democratic polities.
Consistent with previous research, my results indicate British colonial legacy has a
positive impact on democratic survival after independence. Second, I evaluate the
impact of imposed liberal institutions on the persistence of democracy. Polities with
imposed, liberal institutions are more likely to survive after independence than other
democratizing states. Both British colonial legacy and imposed liberal institutions are
significant indicators of democratic survival of polities in the post-colonial period.
Although the British Colonial Legacy Model is a better fit for the data, the theoretical
arguments regarding British colonies revolve around the interaction of the citizenry
with liberal imposed institutions. My results lend support to the argument that
imposed liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democracies and therefore
should be included in models of colonial legacy and democratic survival.
The majority of former colonies in my dataset are former British colonies and are
among the longest lasting democratic polities. Thus, I examine the impact of imposed
liberal institutions on former British colonies. My analysis included British colonies
with imposed institutions and those that did not have imposed institutions. Results
of the duration analysis indicate the built liberal institutions also have a strong, posi-
tive impact on the survival of former British colonies. The results suggest the British
colonial practice of creating institutions within their colonies contribute to the post-
independence democratic success. The liberal institutions built to facilitate colonial
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administration and cultivate a long-term positive relationship after independence fa-
cilitated the survival of democracy after the end of the colonial period. Those British
colonies without imposed liberal institutions are much more likely to fail after inde-
pendence than those with such political structures.
To assess whether the positive impact of imposed liberal institutions is limited to
former British colonies, I repeat my test on a subset of cases including American
colonies, French colonies, and democratizing states without colonial legacy. The
presence of imposed institutions is not connected with democratic survival in former
American and French colonies. However, those colonies with six or more liberal steps
are more likely to persist after independence. The results indicate there is a threshold
for the number of imposed liberal steps. This implies that the installation of a small
amount of liberal institutions is not likely to contribute to the democratic survival of
former American and French colonies.
These results only tell us about one part of the relationship between imposed liberal
institutions. Current analysis only studies the presence or absence of the imposed
institutions it does not capture the breadth and complexity of the institutions. That
is, this does not account for the timing of imposition of the institutions, the depth
of the institutions, nor the citizenry’s experience. In the next chapter, I introduce a
dynamic model which accounts for the steps used to build the liberal institution as
well as amount of time the institutions were present in the polity. This will allow for





In the previous chapter, I explore the relationship between imposed liberal institu-
tions and democratic survival. My results indicate the installation of such institutions
within the polity by the former colonizer significantly increase the likelihood of post-
independence survival. Liberal institutions contribute to the survival of democracy
in imposed polities. Within this chapter, I turn the focus of my inquiry from presence
of liberal, imposed institutions to experience with those institutions. To assess this
relationship, I introduce a new conceptualization of imposed liberal institutions, im-
posed liberal steps. Colonial powers did not create complete, liberal institutions as a
whole. Rather, they built the institutions over time in an incremental process. Colo-
nial powers often introduced components of power-sharing institutions over time.
For example, colonial powers often introduced an electoral element to a Legislative
Council first and later it expanded electoral representation over time. An imposed
liberal step is each expansion of liberal rights created in the polity by the imposer, in
this case the colonial power. I employ two conceptualizations of experience; the num-
ber of imposed liberal steps and the timing of the liberal steps. Arguments regarding
the benefits of built institutions focus on experience with institutions and the effect
on democratic survival. Experience with the institutions is gained through interac-
tion with a host of liberal institutions over a period of time. This chapter examines
the following research question, what impact does experience with imposed liberal
steps have on the post-independence democratic survival of former colonies? To test
my research questions regarding liberal institutional experience and democratic sur-
vival, I use duration analysis and sequence analysis. Duration analysis allows me to
model the impact of institutional experience in terms of number of imposed liberal
steps enacted in each colony on the longevity of the democratic polity. Sequence
analysis, relatively new in political science, allows for the inclusion of the number
of liberal steps and the timing of the imposition of institutions during the colonial
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experience. I will discuss this method in greater detail later in the chapter. My anal-
ysis included in this chapter provide insight into the relationship between liberal
institutions and subsequent democratic survival. Also, the use of sequence analysis
illustrates the usefulness of this method of the analysis of political process such as
democratic transition and survival.
4.2 Arguments/Theory Section
The inclusion of imposed liberal polities in the study of colonial legacy provides
greater insight into the relationship between colonial practices and democratic sur-
vival. Literature citing positive benefits of colonial power-sharing institutions imply
experience with the institutions and ability of the institutions to channel interests are
central to the survival of the democratic polity. In other words, the institutions must
work for the citizenry of the colony and subsequent state. There should be sufficient
experience with the institutions to earn the citizen’s faith in the institutions. There-
fore, depth of the liberal institutions and experience with imposed liberal institutions
are important factors affecting the survival of democratic polities after the colonial
power has relinquished control. As the institutions grow deeper and successfully
channel interests of citizens, faith in the institutions and civic culture grows.
For imposed liberal institutions to contribute to the democratic survival after the
colonial power leaves, the institutions must be habituated. Rustow asserts habitua-
tion is one of the necessary ingredients for the creation of democracy (1970). Simi-
larly, Schmitter and Karl assert “to work properly the ensemble must be institution-
alized - that is to say, the various patterns must be habitually known, practiced and
accepted by most, if not all actors” (1991, 76). Ensemble refers to the system of gov-
ernance and the various patterns of the system may be written or informal. More
succinctly, they conclude the system of government becomes the ’rules of the game.’
To achieve this habituation, the citizenry and elite must interact with institutions
over time. In addition to habituation, interaction with liberal institutions leads to the
growth of civic culture.
Like habituation, civic culture is a necessary component of a polity’s democratic
foundation. Almond and Verba, the preeminent scholars of civic culture define po-
litical culture as a set of values and attitudes shared by citizens of the state towards
their political system. Verba explains political culture as “[t]he system of empirical
beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political
action takes place” (1965, 513). Civic Culture is a particular type of political culture
and is one of three types defined by Almond and Verba. According to Almond and
Verba’s conceptualization, civic culture is the relationship between people and their
polity in which the citizens accept the authority of the state and are able to partici-
pate in their government. Political culture is "the connecting link between micro- and
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macropolitics" (Almond and Verba 1963, 33). Civic culture denotes “a pluralistic cul-
ture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity,
a culture that [permits] change but [moderates] it” (Almond and Verba 1963, 8). Al-
mond and Verba assert that civic culture enables democracies to thrive (1963). Other
authors such, as Putnam (1993), refer to these norms and behaviors, as well as the
social institutions which support them as civic culture. Similarly, Putnam argues that
civil society is necessary for democracies to function (1993). The culture in which in-
stitutions work is critical for the successful operation of democratic institutions (Put-
nam 1993). This underscores the argument that presence of institutions alone does
not explain democratic survival. Civic culture provides an essential connection be-
tween mass civic culture and democratic institutions (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Baker,
Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Putnam 1993; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; van
Deth and Scarbrough 1996; Inglehart 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2001;
Norris 2002)
In addition to providing a base for democracy, civic culture is essential to the health
of the polity and is a necessity for consolidated democracies. Furthermore, a state’s
democratic political institutions are reinforced and bolstered by civic culture (Fukuyama 1995).
“The development of stable political commitment may hinge upon the ability of
the political system, especially in its formative stages, to produce output that sat-
isfies the expectations of the members of the system. Only in this way can a stable
and balanced commitment to the system be created and maintained” (Almond and
Verba 1963, 504). Although one may expect such a system to lead to collective
action problems in which the majority may seek to change the rules to their favor,
social capital functions as a solution for the collective action problem of civic activity
(Putnam 1993). Social capital is the benefit people derive from cooperation. Those
benefits lead to norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement which builds
and reinforces trust. As people see the value in cooperative behavior, uncertainty
and pay off for defection are reduced. Additionally, successful cooperation provides
frameworks for future cooperation. As social capital grows, cooperation becomes
iterative and the likelihood of cooperation among actors increases. Thereby, con-
cludes Putnam, civic culture contributes towards a sturdy foundation for democratic
institutions, assists in the deepening of the institutions, and through the reciprocal
relationship supports democratic survival.
More specifically civil society has important implications on polities’ democratic out-
comes. Putnam found civic engagement to have positive impact on the efficacy of
regional government (Putnam 1993). The fore-mentioned social capital not only pre-
vents collective action problems but it contributes towards a strong economy which
in turns bolsters a state’s democracy (Almond 1980). Edward Shils asserts a strong
civil society is able to protect minority groups from the self-interest of the majority
(1991). The system is able to facilitate cooperation among groups and thereby fos-
ter successful democracies as these outcomes signal the efficacy of the system to the
citizenry.
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The benefits of habituation and civil society require interaction with the political sys-
tem over a period of time. In this project, I refer to such interaction over time as
democratic experience. Democratic experience is built through interaction with lib-
eral institutions. Studies of democratization often use prior democratic experience as
a control variable as it is a strong of democratic survival and consolidation. Accord-
ing to Feng and Zak, states with previous democratic institutions are five times more
likely to lead to become consolidated democracies (1999, 174). Such experience fa-
cilitates growth of civic culture and faith in political institutions. Liberal institutions
imposed by the colonial powers provide for experience with democracy. Weiner,
discussing British colonial legacy, explains there are two parts of British tutelage
benefits: institutions and political culture (Weiner 1987). The relationship between
state and civil society is an important part of the democratic success of former British
colonies. Particularly, experience with strong political institutions is associated with
the persistence of post-colonial states (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004).
The amount of experience with institutions leads to greater faith in the institutions
and view that the institutions, and subsequently the democratic regime, is legiti-
mate. Institutionalization, or consolidation does not indicate that there is not conflict
in the political system, but that there is regular conflict which is channeled pacifically
through the democratic institutions. Rustow (1970) describes the role of conflict as
central to the heart of democracy. Likewise, Przeworski (2005) asserts the survival
of democracy relies on a state’s ability to manage conflict. It follows, that success-
ful processing of the conflict is a measure of democratic success not the absence of
conflict.
For the majority of institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions in one
decree or act of law. Rather the liberalization of the colonies was progressive. The
process can be seen as an incremental one in which each expansion of liberal rights
can be seen as a step towards democracy. This process is reflected in British colo-
nial policy after 1945 which “prescribed the steady introduction of phase after phase
of constitutional development, carefully graduated to the individual needs of each
colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceleration became possible and
desirable” (Darwin 2007, 89). Later the policy was reiterated in 1961 report, Polit-
ical Advance in the United Kingdom Dependencies, “The constitutions are altered stage
by stage to give local people a more representative and a more responsible share
in the government in their country” (Reference Division Central Office of Informa-
tion 1961a, 3). Such statements are consistent with the view of democracy as a
process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry Diamond explains,
“democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon” (1999, 18). Most
democracies are built from “a patchwork of blocks and beams” (Diamond 1999, 21).
Thus, institutions are created over time. I refer to the parts of this incremental intro-
duction of democratic institutions as liberal steps. The more liberal steps the more
experience with democracy and, subsequently, greater faith in the democratic polity
after independence. Therefore, I posit:
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Hypothesis 1: The more liberal steps in the colony, the greater likeli-
hood of democratic persistence in the post-colonial period.
In addition to experience with liberal steps, time with the institutions is needed for
habituation and the growth of civic culture. To allow for habituation of institution
Rustow asserts the “ingredients” of democracy should be introduced over time (Rus-
tow 1970, 35). Stepan concurs time is needed for the democratic empowerment of
civilians necessary for them to monitor government actions (Stepan 1988). Jansson,
Lindenfors, and Sanberg find evidence to support Rustow and Stepan’s assertions;
concluding states which encounter slow transitions are more likely to survive 2013.
Concurring, Gasiorowski and Power explain democratic consolidation is a slow pro-
cess, democratic institutions need time to take root (1998). To summarize, democra-
tization is a process which occurs gradually over time.
It is unlikely that the introduction of liberal institutions or liberal steps without suf-
ficient time for interaction with the institutions would allow for the entrenchment
and evolution of institutions. As discussed previously, the French and British built
liberal institutions in their colonies, however, the colonizers differed in the timing of
institution imposition. The French often introduced power-sharing elections shortly
before independence. This late introduction led to the prevalence of one-party rule
in the post-colonial period (Collier 1982). The British, on the other hand, created
institutions at different points in the colonial period due to the domestic context of
the colony (Brown 1999). In cases were institutions were created early, such as Ja-
maica, the colony had a longer time period for habituation and the growth of civic
culture. On the other hand, in cases such as Uganda where institutions were created
very close to independence, there was not much. The more interaction with liberal
institutions, the more likely the institutions are to become habituated, seen as effec-
tive, and build civic culture which will serve to bolster faith in the institutions. Thus,
I assert:
Hypothesis 2: The more interaction the citizenry has with liberal steps
in the colony, the greater the likelihood of democratic persistence in the
post-colonial period.
4.3 Hypothesis One Duration Analysis
4.3.0.1 Number of Liberal Steps Democratic Survival Model
Duration of Democratic Episode = α + β1Number of Imposed Liberal Steps - β2Party
Fractionalization + β3Economic Performance + β4Level of Development - β5Religious
Fractionalization - β6Ethnic Fractionalization
74 Institutional Experience and Democratic Survival
4.3.1 Duration Analysis
To test my hypotheses, I construct a data set of democracies that began to democ-
ratize between 1946 - 1969. In the construction of my dataset, I use Enterline and
Greig’s imposed polity conceptualization and data set, previously discussed in the
literature review, to identify 18 former colonies with imposed institutions which
gained independence between 1946 and 1969. Next using Bernhard, Reenock and
Nordstrom’s (2004) Colonial Legacy Data Set, I identify democratic episodes which
began between 1946 and 1969. They define a democratic episode as a period of
democracy in a state’s history. An episode ends when the democracy fails. A demo-
cratic episode contains multiple observations which capture each year a state is a
democratic polity. The episodes included their data set include episodes for former
colonies which includes those with liberal, imposed institutions and those without
such institutions, as well as states that did not experience colonization and whose
democratic growth is mainly attributed to internal factors. The last year for both
datasets is 1995. Using their operationalization, I extend the datasets to 2010. My
dataset includes 34 democratic episodes over the time period 1951-2010. The coun-
tries included in the dataset are listed in Figure 4.11.
1There are two sets of countries included in the dataset. The first are former colonies with lib-
eral, imposed institutions. The second serves as a comparison set of states experiencing a democratic
episode. Those states do not have liberal, imposed institutions. Some of the states included in the
second set are former colonies. Former Spanish colonies include: Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The Dutch held Indonesia as a colony. Madagascar was a
French colony. South Korea was under control of Japan. The United Kingdom colonized Myanmar and
Trinidad. Somalia was under joint rule of the British and Italians.
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Figure 4.1: Countries Included in the Dataset
Using this dataset allows for direct comparison with findings in the colonial legacy
literature and those of the previous chapter. Later in this chapter, I build a model
using sequence analysis to assess whether there is a patterns
4.3.2 Dependent Variable
For this model, the dependent variable is the length of a state’s democratic episode
taken from Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom’s Colonial Legacy Dataset (2004). As
explained earlier, a democratic episode is a period of democracy in a polity’s history.
The size of the democratic episode is measured as the number of years in a state’s
democratic episode. A state enters a democratic episode when the state achieves a
minimum level of democracy. A democratic episode ends when the democracy fails.
In other words, the episode ends when the state transitions to another regime type or
experiences an interruption or interregnum period. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nord-
strom (2004) gathered their cases from Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1995), the Politi-
cal Regime Change Dataset (Gasiorowski 1996), Freedom in the World, the Political
Handbook of the World, and Classifying Political Regimes (Przeworski et al. 1996).
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4.3.3 Independent Variable
For my independent variable, I use number of liberal steps imposed by the colonial
power. Liberal steps include:
• an elected member on a decision-making body;
• judiciary;
• constitution outlining citizens’ rights;
• expansion of suffrage;
• free and fair elections
• increase of number of elected members on a decision-making body;
• amendments to constitution to include more liberal rights;
• adoption of a new constitution which provides more rights than the previous
constitution;
• popularly elected leader;
• full enfranchisement; and
• autonomous, democratic rule within colony.
Each liberal step denotes an increase in democratic rights of the colony. The concept
of liberal step captures the British colonial practice of installation of liberal insti-
tutions. Polities do not have a fixed number of liberal steps as the installation of
power-sharing institutions varies across polities.
The British method of promoting political advance in the dependencies
has been to create, with co-operation of the local people, sometimes from
the most primitive beginnings, territorial governments which, like the
governments of more mature democracies, comprise a legislature or law-
making body, and executive body (which, with the Governor, is the exec-
utive authority) and an independent judiciary. The various Governments
of the dependencies enjoy a large and increasing measure of autonomy.
The role of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, the
Colonial Office, is to advise and to guide rather than actually to direct
their affairs (Reference Division Central Office of Information 1959, 3).
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For the majority of institutions, the colonizers did not create the institutions in one
decree, act of law or instance. Rather the liberalization of the colonies was pro-
gressive. “The constitutions are altered stage by stage to give local people a more
representative and a more responsible share in the government in their country”
(Reference Division Central Office of Information 1961a, 3). As democratization
is an incremental process each liberal step moves a state along the continuum of
democracy. “British colonial policy after 1945 prescribed the steady introduction
of phase after phase of constitutional development, carefully graduated to the indi-
vidual needs of each colony, until at the end of the day a more rapid acceleration
became possible and desirable” (Darwin 2007, 89). This is consistent with the view
of democracy as a process in contemporary research on democratization. Larry Di-
amond explains, “democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon”
(1999, 18). To reflect this incremental process, instead of coding discrete cases of in-
stitutional building or establishment, I code those incremental steps of liberalization.
For example, I code the creation of a Legislative council with some elected repre-
sentation as one step. If the council is expanded to allow more popularly elected
representation, I code that as another step. If the council is transformed into a pop-
ularly elected legislature, that is coded as another step. This is consistent with work
in democratization where democracy falls on a continuum and states may progress
towards democratic consolidation.
Figure 4.2: Ghana Liberal Steps
To gather liberal step data, I use historical records, historical dictionaries, as well as
individual country histories for each of the 18 cases in this study. Particularly, I use
British Central Office of Information Pamphlets which provided detailed information on
the imposed institutions and liberal steps. Additionally, I consulted United States
Library of Congress Country Reports, historical dictionaries and individual country his-
tories for my cases. These sources provided information on the date of creation and
structure of the institution. As I did not have the budget to hire multiple coders,
I consulted multiple sources to corroborate the liberal expansions implemented by
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the colonial power. However, additional coders were not needed as I use relatively
simple coding rules which did not require judgments about the amount of liberal
expansion created by each liberal step. Figure 4.2 contains the liberal steps imposed
in Ghana. In this project, liberal steps are weighted equally. For each liberal institu-
tions, or a liberal step, I record it on the country time line, noted the type of liberal
step, and year in which it was created. As I do not have a priori expectations, equal
weighting of each liberal step is the most appropriate approach. In future research, I
will explore patterns of liberal expansion through different types and combinations
of liberal steps. The coding scheme I employed for liberal steps is easily expanded
and replicable. Appendix A contains time lines for each of my 18 cases. Each liberal
step is noted above the time line while historical events are noted below.
4.3.4 Control Variables
To accurately assess the impact of imposed political institutions and other factors of
interest, I control for other factors influencing polity duration. Level of development,
economic performance, presidential system, religious fractionalization, and ethnic
fractionalization all have been argued to have a significant impact on the persistence
of polities.
Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater democratic per-
sistence (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To capture a state’s level of economic
development, I use GDP per capita in constant 1990 International Dollars. To facili-
tate analysis, I scale the unit of measurement from one international dollar to 1,000
international dollars. The information was gathered from the 2013 Maddison Project
Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013).
Conversely, economic contraction is associated with the failure of democratic polities.
Poor economic performance is potentially damaging to the persistence of democratic
polities (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Remmer 1991). Economic Performance is
measured as the proportion of yearly change in GDP per capita. I use data from the
2013 Maddison Project Dataset (Maddison-Project 2013) to calculate the proportion
of yearly change.
In addition to control for economic factors, I control for social fragmentation by in-
cluding measures that capture ethnic and religious fractionalization. Ethnic and re-
ligious cleavages complicate the chance of survival for democracies. Such divisions
create additional challenges to nascent political institutions, as they are more likely
to have home interests than the fledgling political institutions are able to channel. I
use Selway’s ethnic and religious fractionalization measures from his Cross-cutting
Cleavages dataset (2011). Although this dataset includes cross-cutting cleavages, I
use the single dimensional ethnic and religious fractionalization as the data is avail-
able over the time period of my dataset. Both measures range from zero to one where
zero indicates no fractionalization and the larger the score, the more fractionalization
present.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Number of Liberal Steps 6 (mode) 7.739 0 26
Economic Performance 0.024 0.045 -0.149 0.279
Level of Economic Development 5312.657 4833.739 419.358 21314.380
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.438 0.200 0.002 0.930
Religious Fractionalization 0.412 0.213 0.003 0.799
Per Polity
697 total observations for 34 polities 20.5 1 60
First Enry Time = 0
Exit Time 21.265 1 63
723 total analysis time at risk 21.265 1 63
25 Failures 0.735 0 1
4.3.5 Results of Duration Analysis
The dataset I employ to test hypothesis one includes 697 observations for 34 subjects.
For this inquiry, the observation is the country-year. The subjects are democratic
episodes of polities with imposed liberal steps and those without such steps. In the
data set there is only one failure per state. The data is organized as a single-failure
per subject which means there is only one failure per subject in the database. In this
case failure denotes the end of the democratic episode. The polities were at risk of
failure 723 times. Within the analysis, In this analysis there are 25 failures, which
indicates 25 of the 34 democratic polities failed. The correlation between the vari-
ables capturing liberal steps and British colonizer is 0.61. A correlation describes the
connection between two variables, particularly, it describes the degree to which the
variables vary together. A high correlation between two variables indicates a strong
relationship. As a result of this high correlation, I am unable to include both vari-
ables in the model. The high correlation is due to the British tendency to imposed
liberal institutions within colonies to aid in the administration of the colony. How-
ever, this is not a problem, as this project is focused in assessing the impact imposed
liberal institutions - not the identity of the colonizer. The use of number of imposed
liberal steps assesses the impact each liberal step has on democratic survival. The
high but not perfect correlation between British and liberal steps, lends evidence to
the assertion the British did not uniformly impose institutions in all of their colonies.
The results of my are reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. My results indicate im-
posed liberal steps are associated with survival in the post-colonial period. The
positive impact of imposed liberal steps is consistent across the Weibull, Cox and
Non-Proportional Hazard models. In addition to the Weibull model, I use a Cox
model and conducted a test for violations of the proportional hazard assumption
of the Cox and Weibull models. This assumption assumes the hazards functions of
a variable are proportional over time. The results of the test are reported in Table
Three. Like Chapter Three, level of economic development violates this assumption.
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Table 4.2: The Impact of Liberal Steps on Democratic Survival
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model Cox NPH Model
Number of Liberal Steps 0.891*** 0.901** 0.897**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040)
Economic Performance 0.012 0.037 0.045
(0.047) (0.168) (0.209)
Level of Economic Development 0.661*** 0.688*** 0.478***
(0.101) (0.102) (0.122)
Ethnic Fractionalization 8.973 5.273 3.379
(13.381) (7.394) (5.051)
Religious Fractionalization 5.633* 3.946 4.723
(5.939) (4.007) (5.074)
Economic Performance x Time 1.012**
(0.005)
Constant 0.015
Log Likelihood -42.171 -64.422 -63.318
Rho 1.297
(0.171)
NOTE: N = 691. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table 4.3: Test of Proportional-Hazards Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Number of Liberal Steps 0.150 0.79 0.376
Economic Performance -0.047 0.11 0.738
Level of Economic Development 0.412 6.89 0.009
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.190 2.37 0.124
Religious Fractionalization -0.255 3.88 0.049
Global Test — 9.48 0.091
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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To correct for the potential problems of this violation I include level of economic de-
velopment multiplied by time. After correcting for the violation of the proportional
hazard assumption, imposed liberal steps remain a significant predictor of demo-
cratic survival. For each liberal step installed in the colony, the odds of survival after
independence increase by 10.3 percent. For the control variables, religious fractional-
ization was only significant in the Weibull model. Consistent with arguments present
in the literature, religious fractionalization is hazardous for democratic survival. As
with previous models, level of economic development has a strong, positive affect on
the survival of imposed polities.
These results support my assertion that the more imposed liberal steps, the more
likely the polity is to persist. The more the colonizer expands democracy within the
colony prior to independence, the more likely the democratic polity will survive in
its post-colonial period. The more liberal steps installed, the more interaction the
citizenry has with the institutions. If the institutions are able to channel their inter-
ests, it is likely they will view the institutions as legitimate. Such positive interaction
leads to the growth of civic culture which further reinforces the liberal political in-
stitutions. This, however, is only one part of the polities’ democratic institutions.
Inclusion of the Number of liberal steps in this model only provides information on
one aspect of the impact on democratic survival but does not provide information
on interaction over time with the liberal steps. In the next section, I use sequence
analysis to examine how the length of time with the liberal institutions affects the
likelihood of survival of the democratic polities.
4.3.6 Sequence Analysis
To test my second hypothesis, I use sequence analysis. As this method is relatively
new to political science, I will explain the purpose of the method as well as some
of its applications. Sequence analysis is a method which models processes. "It com-
pares chronological sequences of states within a holistic conceptual model instead
of observing allegedly independent observations over time" (Blanchard, Bühlmann,
and Gauthier 2014, 1). The method was first used in the biological sciences to study
sequences such as DNA. Later, it was adapted for use in the social sciences and is
frequently used in sociology. Its use in political science is relatively new (Casper and
Wilson 2011, 2015; Range, Wilson, and Sandberg 2015). Like duration analysis, time
is integral to the model. However, it moves beyond providing likelihoods of survival
and enables a detailed exploration of causal processes. Using optimal matching, the
most often applied comparison of sequences, researchers are able to compare and
contrast similarities and differences among sequences and subsequences. Thus, it
provides a link between qualitative and quantitative analysis, it enables the investi-
gation of social processes (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014). This approach
is well-suited for the study of democratization and democratic survival as it allows
for the investigation of institutions, norms, and values (Cornwell 2015). Second,
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sequence analysis enables the quantification and testing of arguments regarding the
order of political states (Casper and Wilson 2015). This approach is enables re-
searchers to examine questions regarding patterns of liberalization, transitions from
or to democracy, the consequences of certain patterns, and how different time pe-
riods of a state’s democratic experience influence its democratic future. As such,
sequence analysis is an appropriate tool to analyze complex transitions and events.



















As the name would suggest, the main focus, or unit of analysis, is the sequence.
Sequences are "the succession of the observed states for one unit of observation over
a given time period" (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014, 5). Or more simply,
an order lists of states or elements (Brzinsky-Fay, Kohler, and luniak 2006; Corn-
well 2015). In addition to states, sequences include events which denotes a move
from one state to another. Sequences are composed of a finite number of states from
an alphabet as defined by the researcher. The alphabet contains the complete set of
states that may appear in sequences. For example the alphabet used to construct
sequences in this chapter are C, L, I, and F, where C stands for colonial status, L
for liberal steps, independence denotes independent democracy and F marks polity
failure. Some states experience failure while others do not as the democracies persist
after the last year in the dataset, 2010. A list of the sequences for each case are listed
in Appendix C. Data in sequences are organized in ordered arrays (Macindoe and
Abbott 2004). In many cases, the states are ordered according to a unit of time, i.e.,
day, month or year. I use year of colonial experience and democratic episode as the
unit of time where the sequence begins with the first year of colonial possession con-
tinues each year until the independent, democratic polity fails. As it does not follow
the calendar it is considered an internal time reference in which the origin of the time
axis is the first observation of a starting event. States may be repeated throughout the
sequence and may appear in consecutive time period. For this chapter, states are or-
ganized into four groups of states: colonial period, liberalization period, democratic
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independence and polity failure. The sequence model in this chapter is reported in
Figure 4.3 while the sequences for my 18 cases are listed in Appendix C. Once con-
structed sequences are used to describe, visualize, and summarize data as well as the
identification identification of patterns.
After constructing my sequences, I import the sequences and covariates into an R
database for analysis. The dataset, or data frame as it is referred to in R, is organized
in longitudinal data representation where there is one row per country. I use the
state-sequence or STS format which is the most commonly used representation in
sequence analysis. In the data frame the sequences are contained in columns nine
to 366 where sequence states are listed in consecutive columns. Those columns rep-
resent the years under colonial control and democratic episode with the maximum
number of years over this period is 358. Columns one and two include country names
and codes. The remaining columns, three to seven, contain covariates capturing years
under colonial rule to the end of the democratic polity, years from independence to
polity failure, number of imposed liberal steps and two variables capturing the level
of imposed liberal steps.
Figure 4.4: Number of Years by State










































Using The TraMineR package, a R-package for sequence analysis, I conduct my anal-
ysis (Gabadinho et al. 2010). I separate the sequences into two groups. The sequences
were filtered based on whether the polities persisted or failed. At the heart of this
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test is my interest in the impact of the amount of experience with liberal imposed
steps on the duration of time spent as a independent democratic polity. An implicit
assumption is that sequences are independent as the result of democratic survival is
due to the institutional history and the growth of civic culture rather than influence
of other democratizing states. I computed the mean of each state for the polities
that failed and polities that persisted. The results are reported in Figure 4.4. The
states whose democratic polity persisted had more experience with liberal, imposed
steps. Conversely, states which failed had, on average, less interaction with liberal
imposed steps. The results of this initial sequence analysis, support hypothesis two;
the more experience with liberal, imposed steps, the more likely a democratic polity
is to survive.
Second, I conduct optimal matching to investigate the common sequences among
colonies with imposed institutions. This method is useful to identify similar pattern
among groups of sequences (Casper and Wilson 2011). Optimal matching is descrip-
tive rather than causal in its orientation (Macindoe and Abbott 2004). To identify the
appropriate number of clusters for sequences I use the formula of k =
√ n
2 which is
often used to identify the optimal number of categories for a sample (Cornwell 2015).
For this analysis, k =
√
18
2 as there are 18 cases. Thus, the most appropriate number
of clusters is three. Again using the TraMineR package, I computed pairwise optimal
matching. In this analysis, distances between sequences with an insertion and dele-
tion cost of one and a substitution matrix based on observed transition rates. I chose
this insertion deletion cost as I do not have any a priori assumptions regarding the
substitution costs. In optimal matching, the sequences are assumed to be indepen-
dent. As the arguments regarding democratic survival are due to the institutional
history and the growth of civic culture rather than other democratizing states, this
assumption is not violated. Within the sequence used in the optimal matching analy-
sis there are three statuses: colonization, liberal steps, and independence. During the
colonization period, the polity is under colonial administration but liberal steps have
not yet been introduced by the colonizer. Over the liberal steps period, the polity
is still under colonial administration, however, the colonial power has introduced
at least one liberal step. Lastly, over independence the polity is an independent,
democratic polity no longer under colonial administration. The independence pe-
riod ceases when the democratic polity fails.
The results of optimal matching are represented in Figure 4.52 Cluster One demon-
strates a short period of liberal steps and a subsequent short period of independence.
Nine of the sequences follow this pattern. The second cluster shows a period of im-
posed institutions early in the polity’s colonial experience, a period of liberal steps
and a longer period of independence. In this cluster there are six sequences. Cluster
Three represents sequences where the polity was under colonial rule for a longer
period of time before liberal steps were implemented. This group experienced less
2The graphics represent the tendencies of the similar sequences and are not the sequences stacked
on top of each other.
§4.4 Conclusion and Implications 85














































years of liberal steps than cluster two but more liberal steps than those in cluster
one. The liberal steps appear to have taken root and this group has the longest rates
of democratic survival (n=3). These results demonstrate the disparate experiences of
colonies with imposed liberal institutions. Those polities with few liberal steps over
a shorter period are more likely to fail after independence. While those with more
experience with liberal steps are more likely to persist after independence.
4.4 Conclusion and Implications
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of interactions with liberal,
imposed institutions. As argued previously in this chapter, institutions must be ha-
bituated for the benefits to be present after independence. The mere presence of
institutions nor a large number of institutions is sufficient for the imposed institu-
tions to foster democratic survival in the post-colonial period. Habituation and civic
culture are cultivated through successful interaction with the political institutions In-
teraction with imposed liberal institutions referred to as democratic experience. As
democratization is an iterative process, I introduce the conceptualization of liberal
steps which captures each expansion of liberal rights. As described previously, each
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liberal step denotes an expansion of liberal rights through the introduction or expan-
sion of elected representation, elections, constitutions and judiciaries. Through the
use of liberal steps, I am able to model the process of democratization using duration
analysis as well as sequence analysis.
Using duration analysis, I explore the question whether experience contributes to
post-independence democratic survival. My results indicate there is a link between
imposed liberal steps during the colonial experience and the length of the demo-
cratic episode after independence. Results from my duration analysis identify a
larger number of liberal steps is associated with longer democracy duration. Sec-
ondly, sequence analysis results suggests the longer time with imposed liberal steps
is correlated with democratic survival. When combined my results indicate the more
experience with liberal, imposed steps, in terms of number and time, have a lasting
effect on ability of democracy to survive.
These results should not be taken as evidence that the presence of imposed insti-
tutions over a long period of time is sufficient to produce benefits of civic culture
and habituation. Repeated interaction during which the citizenry’s interests are
channeled through the institutions is needed to build such benefits. Three distinct
patterns arose in the the analysis of the sequences. Among former colonies with
imposed institutions, those with very little liberalization and colonial history have
shorter democratic episodes. Secondly, in some cases the imposed institutions took
root quickly and supported strong democracies after independence. Lastly, states
with great deal of liberalization during the colonial period also have long democratic
episodes.
Prior studies have noted the importance of previous democratic experience for demo-
cratic survival and consolidation. These results support those previous results. How-
ever, rather than relying on variables to capture the identity of the colonizer or the
tendencies of particular colonizer, I include the institutions in the analysis. The in-
clusion of institutions in the model explain disparate findings in the the colonial
legacy literature. Colonial experience, especially in institutional terms, varied across
colonies. Therefore, the inclusion of one variable which does not account for differ-
ences in number of imposed institutions nor timing cannot fully describe the impact
of the colonial period after independence. Secondly, the inclusion of institutions in
the model enables an exploration of the path of democratization in states rather than




In this project, I explore whether imposed, liberal institutions installed by a colonial
power affect the persistence of democracies in the postcolonial period. Of particu-
lar interest is the impact of imposed liberal institutions and the citizenry’s interac-
tion with those institutions on democratic survival of the polity after independence.
Lastly, using sequence analysis, a relatively new method to political science, I in-
vestigate the process of the installation of liberal steps in colonies and the effect of
those steps on post-independence democracy. My overarching question is - if a state
imposes democratic institutions within another state will the imposed polity persist?
The installation of democracy within other states by foreign powers is a reoccurring
theme of international politics since antiquity. Active efforts to impose democracy
have waxed and waned over modern history, resulting in cycles or waves of imposed
democracy (Owen 2002). Today, many developed democracies include democratic
expansion as a major foreign policy tenet. Within these tenets, democratic enlarge-
ment is presented as a solution to solve a variety of regional and international prob-
lems as well as to further the foreign policy of democratic powers. The persistence
of democratic expansion through imposition points to the importance of systematic
study of external democratization. Additionally, this area of research contributes to
our understanding of external democratization, an understudied area in comparative
politics and international relations. However, one area of external democratization
which has received a great deal of attention is British colonial legacy particularly the
benefits of the creation of liberal institutions to enable administration of the colony.
Despite the large amount of literature on the impact of British colonial legacy, there
are conflicting conclusions on whether British colonial legacy contributes to demo-
cratic survival. I assert the lack of consensus is due to the indirect testing of the
relationship between imposed institutions and post-colonial survival. In this project,
I draw from the literature on polity imposition, external democratization and British
colonial literature to build my hypotheses. Unlike existing studies of British colo-
nial legacy, I directly test the impact of imposed institutions by colonial powers on
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democratic survival. The change in focus from British colony to imposed institutions
allows for the inclusion of other colonizers who imposed institutions. More impor-
tantly, it allows for applications of the findings to contemporary imposed polities.
In this chapter, I will summarize the key findings of this project. Second, I exam-
ine the implications of the findings and what they tell us about existing knowledge
of colonial legacy, imposed, liberal institutions and polity imposition. Third, I will
discuss the limitations of my study and indicate ways future research may improve
upon those limitations. Fourth, I summarize the broad themes present in the study
and what they tell us about existing research. In the fifth section of my conclusion,
I examine areas of future research. Lastly, I summarize the findings and conclusions
revealed in this project.
5.2 Results and Implications
In Chapter Three, I assess the impact of imposed institutions on the survival of
democracy. Arguments present in the British colonial legacy literature point to the
importance of liberal, power-sharing institutions on the persistence of democracies
after the colonial power withdraws. This relationship has been previously untested
in the literature. The results of my analysis indicate imposed, liberal institutions
are associated with democratic survival after independence. Polities with imposed
liberal institutions are 60.9% more likely to persist than other democratizing states.
Consistent with previous research, British colonial legacy is associated with demo-
cratic survival. However, this relationship is only limited to those British colonies
which have imposed, liberal institutions; former British colonies who did not have
imposed institutions were more likely to experience democratic failure than those
that did have such institutions installed. These results support the assertion that the
positive relationship between British colonial legacy and democratic survival rests
on imposed institutions rather than the British identity of the colonizer. Further-
more, the results challenge the assumption that British colonial legacy is uniform
across colonies. This assumption is inherent in previous studies of colonial legacy
and democratic survival. The uniformity of colonial legacy is likely the cause of
conflicting results in the literature regarding the effect of British-built liberal institu-
tions and democratic survival. To accurately model colonial legacy, researchers must
include conceptualizations and variables which capture precisely what it is about
British colonial legacy which produces the lasting benefits for the democratic polities
after independence.
Additionally, arguments in the British Colonial Legacy Literature infer the more ex-
perience former British colonies have with imposed liberal institutions, the more
likely democracy is to survive after independence. To model this process, I gather
information from historical dictionaries, individual country histories and colonial pa-
pers regarding the democratic institutions installed in the colony by British, French,
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and American colonial powers. To model the democratization process and to pro-
vide an accurate picture of democratic imposition, I employ the conceptualization
of liberal steps to capture this incremental installation of power-sharing institutions.
A liberal step denotes the expansion of democratic rights within a colony. Using
duration analysis, I test whether experience with imposed liberal steps positively
influence the likelihood of democratic survival. My initial examination in Chapter
3 indicates democratic polities with six or more liberal steps are more durable than
those polities with fewer.
In Chapter Four, I use liberal steps to model the process of democratization through
imposition. This approach allows me to include interaction with the liberal steps over
time. Using optimal matching I identify three distinct patterns of democratization
within former colonies with imposed liberal institutions. First, those polities with
few liberal steps and little interaction with them were likely to fail shortly after inde-
pendence. The second group experienced imposition of liberal steps but over a short
period of time. These democratic polities lasted longer than the polities with very
few imposed steps over a short time. In the second group the liberal steps were able
to take root quickly. The third group of imposed polities experienced a host of liberal
steps over a long period of time. These polities had longer democratic episodes after
independence. This group had more opportunities over time to interact with the
institutions created by the liberal steps which enabled the citizenry to build a civic
culture.
Democratic success appears more likely in those states where interaction with the in-
stitutions has been habituated. This habituation enabled civic culture to grow within
the polity. My results indicate habituation and civic culture play an important role
democratic success. My sequence analysis reveal two different types of democrati-
zation patterns through imposed institutions - those which took root quickly, and
others which happened over a longer period of time. It is not sufficient enough for
the imposer to create institutions and wait for democracy to grow. The institutions
must be adopted and used by its citizenry and seen as effective in channeling their
political demands. Thus, it appears they are not purely imposed polities but rather a
hybrid in which the liberal institutions were installed by the colonial power but later
adopted by the people of the polity. Further, the imposer did not install the necessary
foundation of civic culture but that was built, over time, by the citizenry.
The first implication of this study is the need for researchers to change focus from the
identity of colonizer to the power sharing institutions in studies of democratic sur-
vival. Not only is it possible to include institutions in the models of colonial legacy
and democratic survival; it is important to do so to accurately model the relationship
and assess the impact of those institutions. Colonizers who built liberal institutions
in their colonies did not do so in all their colonies nor to the same extent - some
colonies had few liberal institutions imposed while others had a large number over
a greater period of time. Due to the non-uniform creation of institutions, it is neces-
sary to capture the experience of each colony to accurately assess the impact of those
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institutions in the postcolonial period. This assertion is supported by my findings in-
dicating polities with more than six liberal steps are more likely to persist than other
democratizing steps. Secondly, the institution building process can be broken down
into observable components, referred to as liberal steps in this project. Liberal steps
mark the expansion of liberal rights through the introduction of elections, civil rights,
and judicicial bodies. The interaction with the liberal steps produce habitutation and
the growth of civic culture within the citizenry of the polity. Lastly, there seems to
be two patterns of lasting democratization in former colonies with imposed liberal
institutions; those which had numerous liberal steps over a short period of time, and
those which had numerous liberal steps over a longer time. This indicates that there
are different ways for liberal institutions to be habituated within former colonies. In
a future study I will investigate these patterns of democratization in greater detail.
5.3 Limitations
Although this study has produced insights on the impact of imposed, liberal in-
stitutions on democratic survival, there are limitations to this study. First, the study
includes former colonies which gained independence between 1945 and 1969 and de-
mocratizing states whose democratic episode begins over the same time period. This
time period was chosen for a variety of reasons; to capture the second wave of de-
mocratization (Huntington 1991); to allow for comparison of results with those from
existing colonial legacy literature; and, lastly, to allow for data gathering of liberal,
imposed steps. As a result, any broad generalizations and comparisons with later
time periods should be made tentatively. Second, there are only a few non-British,
imposed polities included in the analysis. However, this is not a large problem as the
focus on my thesis is imposed institutions rather than the identify of the colonizer.
This change in focus enables direct testing of the institutional argument and allows
for inclusion of other colonial powers who built liberal institutions in their colonies.
Additionally, this focus on imposed liberal institutions creates opportunities to com-
pare with contemporary imposed polities. Third, as I draw from colonial legacy this
study does not include non-colonial imposed polities and more recent cases of polity
imposition. In future studies, I will expand my analysis to include more colonies as
well as modern, imposed polities with imposed institutions. In Chapter Four, I use
sequence analysis to identify patterns of democratization present in polities, with
imposed liberal steps. The sequence analysis conducted only scrapes the surface of
the types of exploration which can be done with this method. In a subsequent study,
I will create a more complex sequence which differentiates the depth of imposed,
liberal steps in terms of number of liberal steps by the amount of experience with
the liberal, imposed steps. Lastly, this study only looks at imposed democratic poli-
ties. This study does not tell us how imposed authoritarian institutions contribute
to the survival of autocratic states. Imposition of institutions which fall across the
authoritarian/democratic spectrum pose a rich area of research for polity imposition.
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Despite the limitations of this project produces testable hypotheses and fruitful areas
for future research.
5.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be divided into two areas: substantive and meth-
odological. The substantive contribution of this project is the introduction of meas-
urements of liberal imposed institutions and liberal steps to models of colonial leg-
acy and democratic survival. Through this, I demostrate it is possible to capture
and model institutional arguments present in the colonial legacy literature and the
incremental process of democratization. Secondly, the use of duration and analysis
and sequence analysis demonstrate the methodological contribution of introducing
contextual details to quantitative analysis of democratization.
5.4.1 Institutions
I contribute to literature on democratic survival and colonial legacy by showing it is
possible and necessary to include measures to capture imposed liberal institutions.
This project shifts the focus from British colonial legacy to imposed liberal institu-
tions on democratic survival. The British did not install power-sharing institutions
within all their colonies. Equally important, the British were not the only colonial
power to introduce liberal institutions in their colonies; some French and American
colonies experienced liberal institution imposition. This shift of focus to imposed
liberal institutions allows for better understanding of the impact of those institutions
after independence. In this project, I demonstrate it is possible to gather information
on institutions created by the colonizer. I intend to expand the data to include other
colonies with imposed liberal institutions and other types of imposed polities. Im-
posed institutions can be used in future studies where colonial legacy has an impact
on the dependent phenomenon such as democratization, human rights provision and
conflict.
5.4.2 Liberal Steps
In my examination of the institutions imposed by colonizers, I observe liberal insti-
tutions were created over time. To incorporate this expansion of rights, I introduce
the concept of liberal steps. Using this measure of democratization, I am able to
test hypotheses of habituation and growth of civic culture. The analysis of liberal
steps in Chapter 4 is only the beginning of how this can be used in studies of de-
mocratization. As liberal steps captures various kinds of liberal expansion such as
suffrage, elections, civil rights and judicial bodies, it allows for the use of contextual
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factors to study factors of democratization. The use of liberal steps is not limited to
external democratization but also democratization in general. This conceptualization
of democratic expansion enables researchers to study the habituation and growth of
civic culture as this conceptualization introduces a way to model the interaction with
the liberal steps over time. Further, this analysis demonstrates a fruitful method to
capture the incremental expansion of liberal institutions in imposed and other de-
mocratizing polities. Additionally, the inverse of the conceptualization can be use to
study movements from democracy to autocracy.
5.4.3 Methods: Duration and Sequence Analysis
Although not new to studies in international relations, the use of duration analysis
demonstrates the usefulness of this approach in the study of democratization. It
builds upon the work of (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004) to assess the
impact of imposed liberal institutions on democratic survival. The use of duration
analysis allows for the inclusion of competing variables to assess their impact on the
dependent phenomenon with time as an inherent part of the model. This approach
is useful for any phenomenon in which researchers are interested in how factors
contribute to the longevity of a polity, period of peace or human rights provision.
The second methodological contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of the
fruitfulness of sequence analysis. This approach is an extension of duration analysis
which enables researchers to include contextual factors in duration analsis. In partic-
ular, it allows for the modelling of processes with a holistic conceptual model which
does not require obervations to be independent over time. Like duration analysis,
time is integral to the model. However, it moves beyond providing likelihoods of sur-
vival and enables a detailed exploration of causal processes. Using optimal match-
ing, the most often applied comparison of sequences, researchers are able to compare
and contrast similarities and differences among sequences and subsequences. Thus,
it provides a link between qualitative and quantitative analysis and it enables the
investigation of social processes (Blanchard, Bühlmann, and Gauthier 2014). This
approach allows for the study of processes such as democratization and democratic
survival whilst concepts such as habituation, civic culture and the interaction with
institutions can also be included in sequences. Sequence analysis is an appropriate
tool for researchers to study complex transitions and events.
5.5 Conclusion
This project demonstrates the importance of the inclusion of imposed, liberal institu-
tions in the study of colonial legacy as well as polity imposition. As this is the first
study to identify and include political institutions and their building blocks, liberal
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steps, there are numerous areas for future research. First, an expansion of the data
on imposed liberal institutions and liberal steps to include other types of imposed
polities and time periods is needed. Second, this project only scratches the surface
of what sequence analysis can tell us about the process of democratization through
the imposition of liberal steps. In my next paper, I will use sequence analysis to
test the interaction of the number of liberal steps by the amount of experience the
polity had with the liberal steps prior to independence. Future research will include
analysis on whether certain patterns of liberal imposition are more fruitful for fu-
ture democracies. Using sequence analysis, researchers will find further information
about the habituation and rooting of imposed liberal institutions in polities. In sub-
sequent studies, I will need to address at what point does an imposed democratic
polity change to its own democratic polity. As my results indicate it is the citizenry’s
successful interaction with liberal institutions and liberal steps, it follows that it is
not so much the act of imposition which is important but how the institutions work
within the polity is important. Lastly, an important area of future research lies in the
comparison of past imposed polities with contemporary polities such as Afghanistan
and Iraq.
In this thesis, I test hypotheses regarding British colonial legacy on democratic poli-
ties which were once former colonies. Particularly, colonies with imposed liberal
institutions that enable colonial administration are more likely to persist after inde-
pendence. If a state imposes liberal institutions within another state, will the polity
survive after the imposer leaves? As revealed in the literature review, the arguments
about the benefit of British colonial legacy are based on the liberal power-sharing
institutions introduced by the British in colonies. Installation of imposed, liberal in-
stitutions are not limited to British colonies. I add to the study of colonial legacy by
expanding the inquiry to include other colonies which imposed liberal institutions
such as those held by France and the United States. I find imposed liberal institu-
tions contributed to the longevity of democracy in the polity after independence. To
analyze the impact of the imposition of liberal institutions, I introduce the concept of
liberal steps which allows me to model the incremental process of building liberal in-
stitutions by outside forces. The results of the duration analysis indicate each liberal
step significantly enhances the likelihood of democratic survival. Using sequence
analysis, a new method in political science, I examine the patterns of colonial history
and their impact on subsequent democratic survival. I identify two patterns of suc-
cessful democracies those where the institutions took root quickly and those which
had many years of interaction with liberal institutions. My results indicate external
impositions will be successful only when the polity has successful experiences and
interactions with the liberal institutions. Although built by imposers, the institutions
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B.1 Tables of Additional Tests
• All Cases with British Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between
1945 - 1969. Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
– Duration of Colonial Rule - No significant effect on duration of democracy,
control variables consistent with other models: level of development posi-
tive, ethnic and religiou fractionalization deletorious to democratic health.
– PH Tests and NPH Model Years under colonial rule violates the propor-
tional hazard assumption. However, once I account for proportional haz-
ards, results duration of colonial rule still insignificant for former British
colonies
• British Colonial Heritage Cases - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969.
Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
– Categorical Number of steps - Variable of Interest
∗ greater than 7 liberal steps
– Weibull Results 0.268 in Weibull but not significant in the Cox model
– Cox Results
– PH Test no violation of proportional hazard assumption
• British Colonial Heritage Cases - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969.
Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
– Number of Imposed Institutions - Variable of Interest the more liberal,
imposed steps the less likely the polity is to fail
115
116 Additional Tests
Table B.1: Model 2a: The Effect of Years Under Colonial Rule on Former British
Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model Cox NPH Model
Years Under Colonial Rule 0.993 0.996 0.912
(0.008) (0.004) (0.58)
Economic Performance 0.051 0.232 0.200
(0.310) (0.985) (0.804)
Level of Economic Development 0.243** 0.322*** 0.322**
(0.175) (0.130) (0.184)
Ethnic Fractionalization 143.351** 196.320** 55.587*
(368.384) (473.448) (127.563)
Religious Fractionalization 209.628** 36.624** 36.804*
(491.746) (67.305) (70.670)




Log Likelihoood -13.378 -17.117 -14.954
NOTE: N = 360. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table B.2: Model 2a: Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Years Under Colonial Rule 0.537 7.67 0.006
Economic Performance -0.131 0.11 0.744
Level of Economic Development 0.169 0.08 0.772
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.478 2.14 0.144
Religious Fractionalization 0.147 0.15 0.701
Global Test — 2.35 0.799
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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Table B.3: Model 2c: The Effect of Moderate to High Number of Imposed Liberal
Steps on Former British Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps 0.268* 0.399
(0.093) (0.254)
Economic Performance 0.093 0.366
(0.623) (1.426)
Level of Economic Development 0.268* 0.325***
(0.187) (0.131)
Ethnic Fractionalization 330.724* 327.050***
(727.169) (714.577)




Log Likelihoood -12.202 -16.473
NOTE: N = 360. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table B.4: Model 2c: Test of Proportional Hazrd Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps -0.228 0.40 0.525
Economic Performance -0.058 0.02 0.902
Level of Economic Development -0.081 0.01 0.915
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.292 0.42 0.517
Religious Fractionalization 0.063 0.03 0.869
Global Test — 1.46 0.918
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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Table B.5: Model 2d: The Effect of the Amount of Liberal Imposed Steps on Former
British Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Number of Liberal Imposed Steps 0.749*** 0.824***
(0.086) (0.048)
Economic Performance 0.018 0.145
(0.114) (0.452)
Level of Economic Development 0.256** 0.330***
(0.150) (0.115)
Ethnic Fractionalization 963.390*** 614.357***
(2185.777) (1580.914)




Log Likelihoood -10.578 -15.757
NOTE: N = 360. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table B.6: Model2d: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Number of Liberal Imposed Steps -0.142 0.04 0.833
Economic Performance -0.133 0.04 0.839
Level of Economic Development -0.287 0.30 0.581
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.268 0.55 0.457
Religious Fractionalization 0.211 0.33 0.566
Global Test — 1.01 0.961
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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Table B.7: Model 3a: The Effect of Years Under Colonial Rule on Former Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Years Under Colonial Rule 1.003 1.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Economic Performance 0.086 0.172
(0.565) (0.856)
Level of Economic Development 0.441 0.614
(0.251) (0.193)
Ethnic Fractionalization 1350.824** 184.726**
(4035.334) (419.707)




Log Likelihoood -17.205 -25.039
NOTE: N = 320. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table B.8: Model 3a: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Years Under Colonial Rule 0.388 2.15 0.142
Economic Performance 0.293 0.85 0.357
Level of Economic Development 0.332 0.49 0.482
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.414 0.76 0.384
Religious Fractionalization -0.254 0.47 0.494
Global Test — 2.16 0.826
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
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Table B.9: Model 3b: The Effect of the Amount of Imposed Liberal Steps on Former
Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Number of Imposed Liberal Steps 0.849 0.874
(0.118) (0.861)
Economic Performance 0.020 0.053
(0.130) (0.288)
Level of Economic Development 0.397* 0.581
(0.224) (0.241)
Ethnic Fractionalization 217.083** 25.986*
(498.820) (45.885)





NOTE: N = 320. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors
are in parantheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
– Weibull Results 74.9% of hazard of comparison group
– Cox Results 82.4% of hazard of comparison group
– PH Tests no violation
• All Cases of Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969.
Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010. this set of analyses, I test the
effect of competing arguments regarding colonial legacy on all former colonies
with imposed, liberal steps that began democratizing between 1945 and 1969.
– Duration of Colonial Rule - no effect on democratic duration has impli-
cations for use of variable to capture colonial rule over time - does not
capture
– PH Tests No PH violation
• All Cases of Colonial Heritage - Countries democratizing between 1945 - 1969.
Dataset covers the time period from 1945 - 2010.
– Number of imposed institutions - Variable of Interest not significant in all
former colonies - need to account for institutions x experience
– PH Tests - No PH violation
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Table B.10: Model 3b: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Imposed Liberal Institutions 0.365 1.30 0.254
Economic Performance 0.165 0.28 0.596
Level of Economic Development -0.113 0.05 0.823
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.024 0.00 0.9513
Religious Fractionalization 0.0349 0.01 0.934
Global Test —
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )
The robust (White 1980) variance-covariance matrix was used.
Table B.11: Model 3c: The Effect of Moderate to High Number of Imposed Liberal
Steps on Former Colonies
Variables Weibull Model Cox Model
Seven or More Imposed Liberal Steps 0.293* 0.354*
(0.208) (0.198)
Economic Performance 0.083 0.238
(0.579) (1.270)
Level of Economic Development 0.327* 0.470**
(0.193) (0.177)
Ethnic Fractionalization 149.125** 25.367*
(343.1286) (45.872)




Log Likelihoood -15.752 -24.124
NOTE: N = 320. Cell entries are hazard ratios; robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 All significance tests are two-tailed.
Table B.12: Model 3c: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption
Variable rho Chi-square Significance
Seven or More Liberal Steps -0.098 0.11 0.743
Economic Performance 0.078 0.04 0.847
Level of Economic Development 0.031 0.00 0.968
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.011 0.00 0.974
Religious Fractionalization -0.142 0.22 0.642
Global Test — 0.24 0.642
NOTE: All chi-square statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for Global Test (5 df )




Table C.1: Benin Sequence
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L I I F
Table C.2: Botswana Sequence
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Table C.3: Chad Sequence
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I F
Table C.4: Congo Sequence
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I F
123
124 Polity Sequences
Table C.5: Gambia Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I F
Table C.6: Ghana Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L L L L I I I F
Table C.7: India Polity
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I
Table C.8: Jamaica Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Table C.9: Kenya Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L
L L L L L L L L I I F
Table C.10: Malaysia Polity
C C C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I F
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Table C.11: Mauritius Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Table C.12: Nigeria Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L I I I I I I F
Table C.13: Philippines Polity
C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I F
Table C.14: Sierra Leone Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I
I I I I F
Table C.15: Sri Lanka Polity
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
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